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ABSTRACT  
   
Scholars have contemplated gender differences in negotiations for a number of 
years. Recently, attention has been directed to the early stages of a negotiation, 
particularly the propensity to initiate a negotiation. Indeed, there is evidence that men are 
significantly more likely than women to initiate a negotiation (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, 
& Gettman, 2007). In an effort to unpack these findings, the present mixed method study 
partially replicates the quantitative lab study by Small and her colleagues (2007) to 
explore gender differences and then extends this work with qualitative interviews to 
examine the rationales underlying the propensity to negotiate. In the quantitative phase of 
this study, undergraduate students were invited to complete a task in which they could 
earn between $3 and $10 in addition to course extra credit. All participants were offered 
$3 and could earn up to $10 if they initiated a negotiation for more money. The 
qualitative phase of this study included follow-up qualitative interviews to explore the 
reasons women and men chose to initiate or avoid a negotiation. Quantitative results 
demonstrate no significant gender differences in the propensity to negotiate. However, 
qualitative findings reveal trends suggesting that women maintained higher evaluations of 
money but lower probabilities of attaining more money during the negotiation. Findings 
support that clear gender differences exist with regard to perceived risks and the value in 
the decision to negotiate. Thus, findings suggest that gender differences in the propensity 
to negotiate are more complex than which can be quantitatively measured using a simple 
ask-no ask dichotomy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
Women make less money than men in nearly all occupations. Moreover, women 
are paid less than men in male-dominated occupations as well as female-dominated 
occupations. For example, the median income for male secretaries is $803 per week 
while their female colleagues earn $665 per week (Hegewisch, Liepmann, Hayes, & 
Hartmann, 2010; Hegewisch, Williams, & Zhang, 2012). In recent years the wage gap 
between women and men has narrowed, but continues to persist. Reports from the United 
States Census indicate that women earn an average of 82.1% of the wages of men 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013). Economists suggest that many factors collectively 
contribute to the wage disparities between women and men. For example, factors such as 
demographics, professional expertise, job characteristics (Bredtmann & Otten, 2012), 
years of experience, occupational choice, and educational attainment (Blau & Kahn, 
1997; Joy, 2003; Turner & Bowen, 1999) all have been empirically demonstrated to 
account for some of the variance between the wages of women and men. Other 
researchers have suggested the wage gap is partially caused by gender-specific factors 
such as career interruptions as a function of child rearing (Bertrand, Goldin, & Katz, 
2010). Indeed, there are many known factors that help explain why women lag behind 
men in financial earnings.  
While sophisticated statistical modeling has been useful in identifying observable 
factors that contribute to the wage gap (e.g., demographics, occupational choice, family 
commitments, etc.), a substantial percentage of variance remains unexplained (Blau & 
Kahn, 1997, 2007; GAO, 2003). Statements regarding the size of the unexplained 
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variance differ among studies, with some estimates suggesting that 7% (Bredtmann & 
Otten, 2012), 11.8% (Blau & Kahn, 2000), and up to 13% (Wood, Corcoran & Courant, 
1993) is yet to be accounted for. One influential study of the gender wage gap targeted 
starting salary as a key determinant of current salary differences. Gerhart (1990) 
investigated the salaries of 4,617 managers and professionals and his analysis revealed a 
significant gender pay gap for both starting and current salaries. The data were then more 
closely examined by controlling for individual-level factors, such as education, job title, 
performance evaluations, year of hire, and previous work experiences that might explain 
the wage gaps. The study demonstrated that differences in the wages of women compared 
to men could be traced to lower pay at the time of first hire. Gerhart (1990) explains that, 
“the current salary disadvantage was largely a result of a one-time salary shortfall for 
women occurring at the time of hire” (p. 427). In light of the evidence that starting salary 
is an important factor in wage disparities, some researchers have given much closer 
attention to women's reluctance to negotiate higher pay (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; O'Shea 
& Bush, 2002).  
Scholars have increasingly directed their attention to examining the initiation of 
negotiation as an important contributor to the gender wage gap. Babcock and Laschever 
(2003) sparked strong interest in the topic with the publication of their book “Women 
Don't Ask” which contends that women have fared worse than men financially and 
professionally, in large part due to their reluctance to ‘ask.’ In their book, Babcock and 
Laschever (2003) published findings from Babcock and her colleagues' research of 
graduate students demonstrating that their female students were less likely than male 
students to negotiate starting salary. Their study demonstrated that 57% of the male 
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students reported negotiating their starting salary while only 7% of the female students 
said they did so. According to Babcock and Laschever (2003), failure to negotiate 
resulted in pronounced differences in starting salary; those who negotiated earned 
roughly $4,000 more per year than those who did not. The authors explain that 
negotiating starting salary is important because even small differences can accumulate 
over time and result in tremendous differences in one's lifetime income (Babcock & 
Laschever, 2003; Bowles, Babcock & Lai, 2007; Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, 2005; 
Gerhart & Rynes, 1991).  
While scholars have come to understand that the rate of negotiating amongst 
women is deserving of attention, there are some who underestimate this importance. The 
CEO of Microsoft, Satya Nadella, was interviewed at the Grace Hopper Celebration of 
Women in Computing and was asked how women should advance their careers when 
they are uncomfortable putting themselves up for promotion opportunities. Nadealla 
described that human resource systems are rewarding in the long-term. “It’s not really 
about asking for the raise but knowing and having faith that the system will actually give 
you the right raises as you go along.” He went on to say that women who don't ask for 
raises have “superpowers” and will experience “good karma” (Caprino, 2014). Put 
simply, the Microsoft CEO believes that women should trust that the system will 
eventually reward them. While Nadella later recanted his statement, many 
communication scholars argue that mundane or everyday talk can reveal broad societal 
discourses that have the potential to guide action and organizational practices (Fairhurst 
& Putnam, 2004; Tracy & Rivera, 2010). Cleary, there is a need for increased 
understanding of gender issues at the organizational level, particularly if the aim is to 
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advance our understanding of the complexities of the gender wage gap. While gender 
issues in negotiation are not altogether straightforward, scholars have a more cohesive 
understanding of the stages of the negotiation process. Indeed, the stages of the 
negotiation process are a useful foundation with which to begin to understand gender and 
the propensity to initiate a negotiation.  
The Negotiation Process 
By definition, 'negotiating' is an exchange process in which parties interact to 
explore issues and interests to reach an agreement (Lewicki, Barry, Saunders, & Minton, 
2003; Wall, 1985). Shell (2001) describes the sequential stages of negotiation as one that 
includes preparation, information exchange, bargaining, and commitment. Other scholars 
have detailed the dynamic social processes that underlie negotiations (Fisher, Ury, & 
Patton, 1991; Mnookin, Peppett, & Tulemello, 2000; Ury, 1993). Negotiations have more 
recently been described as hazy situations: “The fog of negotiation- it’s inherent 
uncertainty- makes it hard to know how much room there is to negotiate or if there’s any 
room at all” (Wheeler, 2013, p. 23). While preparation is important, there remains a 
significant amount of information that is only revealed through human interaction at the 
negotiation table. Negotiation, by definition, is an interpersonal exchange of information 
and is therefore dynamic, nonlinear, and unpredictable. Therefore, to optimally create 
value it is necessary to develop skills in agility and improvisation. Wheeler (2013) 
suggests that negotiators should enter negotiations under the assumption that there is 
something they do not know. However, these negotiation skills are worthless if one does 
not initiate the negotiation. 
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Initiating a negotiation or 'asking' is more of a one-sided proposal aimed at 
kindling the discussion of whether a negotiation is possible. 'Asking' can be viewed as the 
beginning of a conversation and addresses who “gets to the bargaining table in the first 
place” (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006, p. 3). An ‘ask’ only becomes a 
negotiation once the counterpart accepts the invitation to engage. While some scholars 
argue the propensity to negotiate is a singular act of either initiating or not (Bowles et al., 
2005; Small et al., 2007), other scholars detail the stages of initiating a negotiation. 
Specifically, initiating a negotiation is posited to contain sequential stages of recognizing 
the opportunity, initiating the request, and subsequently optimizing that request 
(Volkema, 2012; Volkema, Kapoutsis, & Nikolopoulos, 2013). Hence, recognizing the 
opportunity is an essential first step for a negotiation to ensue.  
While some situations are generally perceived as negotiable, others are not. For 
example, activities such as buying a home and choosing where to go for dinner are 
frequently identified as negotiable. However, activities such as marriage proposals and 
department store purchases are situations that are less frequently perceived as negotiable 
activities (Spears & Parker, 2009). Indeed, evidence suggests that women and men 
commonly fail to recognize negotiable opportunities. This literature on recognizing 
opportunities is particularly important given that many negotiations in everyday life are 
not entirely obvious (Babcock et al., 2006; Small et al., 2007).  
The Propensity to Negotiate 
Factors that influence the propensity to negotiate can be viewed from a broad 
negotiation perspective, and then more specifically from a gender perspective. Broadly, 
negotiation scholars (Volkema, 2009; Volkema & Fleck, 2012) have outlined two types 
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of barriers affecting the propensity to initiate negotiations: personal characteristics and 
situational factors. First, stable personal characteristics include the perceived 
appropriateness of negotiating (i.e., culture and gender) and one's perceived ability to 
negotiate (self-efficacy). Second, the propensity to initiate a negotiation can be 
moderated by episodic situational factors (i.e., perceived counterpart, role definition, 
time constraints, clarity of purpose, perceived alternatives, venue or setting, and salience 
of outcome). While personal factors are considered to be chronic and situational factors 
more episodic, both factors are useful for understanding the propensity to initiate a 
negotiation.  
More specifically, gender scholars have also cataloged the personal and 
situational factors that trigger gender effects in the propensity to initiate a negotiation 
(Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Babcock, et al., 2006; Erikkson & Sanders, 2012; Small, et 
al., 2007). Personal characteristics that may occur differentially in women and men 
include: relational orientation, locus of control, risk-taking, negotiation experience, and 
recognizing opportunities. To elaborate, women more often perceive themselves as 
strongly interconnected to other people (relational orientation), women are more likely to 
perceive that others maintain control over their lives (locus of control), women are more 
averse to risk (risk-taking), and women are less likely to recognize negotiable 
opportunities and to have fewer negotiating experiences. Situational factors that can 
affect the female negotiator include: an incongruent gender role (Bear & Babcock, 2012; 
Bowles, et al., 2007), the implicit or explicit activation of gender stereotypes (Kray, 
Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002), ambiguity regarding 
what is negotiable and how one should negotiate (Babcock et al., 2006; Bowles et al., 
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2007; Bowles et al., 2005), and lastly the amount of psychological power the negotiator 
perceives she or he has (Small et al., 2007). Notably, these gender differences are 
perceived as byproducts of processes of gender socialization (Babcock & Lashever, 
2003). 
Investigating the separate list of gender-specific factors that influence the 
propensity to initiate a negotiation is particularly necessary when considering a variable 
as notoriously dynamic as gender (Bear & Babcock, 2012; Eagly & Wood, 2013; Kolb, 
2009, 2013). Gender is no longer solely viewed as a fixed and stagnant dichotomous 
variable (Kray & Thompson, 2004); increasingly, gender is viewed as a cultural 
phenomenon that is complex and can shift depending on the situation or circumstance 
(Lengel & Martin, 2002). Volkema (2009) argues that the role of gender in the propensity 
to negotiate is best understood as a cultural phenomenon, meaning that personal 
understandings about negotiation are socially constructed and are thus localized to 
particular times, places, and situations. Not only are personal orientations toward 
negotiation dynamic (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Eisenkraft, 2010), but negotiation situations 
themselves are dynamic. For instance, a given negotiation can involve multiple issues, 
multiple interests, and any number of shifts in individual acts of cooperativeness and 
competitiveness (Kray & Thompson, 2004; Olekalns, Brett, & Weingart, 2003). 
Therefore, the capricious nature of both gender and negotiation make it appropriate to 
expand theory beyond the stagnant and quantifiable to theory that is incorporates 
dynamic human processes that are both interpersonal and situational (Bowles & Kray, 
2013).  
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this mixed method study is to replicate a laboratory study of 
gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation (Small et al., 2007), and then 
to extend this work by adding follow-up qualitative interviews to more comprehensively 
explore the reasons for the enacted behavior. Specifically, this study involves two phases. 
In the quantitative phase, a laboratory study was conducted to replicate previous work 
(e.g., Erikkson & Sanders, 2012; Small et al., 2007) and to examine the rate of gender 
differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. In the qualitative phase, follow-up 
interviews were conducted with all consenting study participants. These interviews were 
used to examine the reasons women and men offer for why they chose to engage or 
refrain from initiating a negotiation. Additionally, these interviews explored the extent to 
which sensemaking and problematic integration were implicated by women and men in 
the decision to engage and avoid negotiations. Taken together, the two phases of this 
study investigated a) if there were indeed gender differences in the propensity to 
negotiate, and b) why individuals refrained from and engaged in negotiations.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Women and men have been compared and contrasted for quite some time, and 
countless theories have emerged to inform our understanding of gender. To this point, it 
has been posited that gender differences and similarities can be understood as a function 
of biological (Buss, 1989; Hines, 1982), psychological (Freud, 1927), and sociological 
mechanisms (Bandura, 1977; Bem, 1974). Renowned scholars acknowledge that gender 
is likely best understood as a complex amalgamation of both nature and nurture. 
Undeniably, there are biological differences between women and men that can affect 
behavior. For example, gender differences in levels of oxytocin and testosterone can 
influence a negotiator's assertiveness and concern for others (Zhong, Monakhov, Mok, 
Tong, Lai, Chew, & Ebstein, 2012). However, in the last twenty-five years socialization 
and norms have been offered as a popular explanation for gender effects in both 
psychology (Eagly & Wood, 2013) and negotiation (Babcock & Lashever, 2004). Strong 
evidence exists to support the belief that male dominance in negotiation is far from 
ubiquitous and can be eradicated with only minor alterations to psychological or 
situational factors. For example, there are no discernible gender differences in the 
propensity to negotiate when women are primed to imagine feeling powerful, but gender 
differences are pronounced in the absence of psychological priming (Small et al., 2007). 
Hence, gender effects in negotiation are likely more complex than biological wiring since 
the situation has a profound effect on whether these gender effects are present. As such, 
gender effects are optimally understood by carefully considering gender norms and 
stereotypes (Bowles & Kray, 2013; Bowles et al., 2005; Kray & Thompson, 2004).  
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Negotiating Like a Lady 
 Gender norms encompass the broad societal beliefs for what is typical for each 
gender. Women are expected to display traits such as warmth, complacency, and 
emotionality, while men are expected to exert dominance, assertiveness, and persistence 
(Eagly, 1987, 1995; Deaux & Major, 1987). Accordingly, these normative beliefs result 
in expectations for the roles women and men should enact in society. Women are 
expected to maintain roles that are communal and nurturing while men are expected to 
maintain roles that are agentic and self-interested (Eagly, 1987). Further, women and men 
often internalize these expectations and they come to view themselves in terms of these 
stereotypical gender-specific qualities (Spence & Helmreich, 1978).  
 Individuals typically are motivated to align with these accepted gender roles and 
are rewarded for doing so. As role congruity theory explains, prejudice can arise when 
one's gender contrasts with the stereotypical qualities of a particular role (Eagly & Karau, 
2002). The theory of role congruity, for example, is supported by research demonstrating 
that female managers encounter more negative feedback than male managers, even when 
both managers are described as successful (Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995). The 
negative pushback directed at successful female managers is explained as resulting from 
the difference between her sex and the stereotypical (male) qualities associated with 
leadership positions (Schein, 1973). In this same way, stay-at-home fathers can encounter 
social stigma because this role is at odds with the traditional male stereotypes (Brescoll & 
Uhlmann, 2005).  
Role congruity theory enlivens our understanding of the propensity to negotiate. 
Just as expectations exist for the qualities of women and men in society, there are 
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expectations of the qualities that typify specific roles, such as a negotiator. Negotiations 
are commonly viewed as masculine endeavors that involve moves of rationality and 
assertiveness. As such, men are viewed as congruent with the role of a negotiator and 
women are viewed as incongruent (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Kray & Thompson, 
2004). It is this role incongruity for women that leaves men with either a perceived or 
actual advantage in negotiations (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Bowles, et al., 2005; 
Miles & LaSalle, 2009) that can heavily influence the decision to initiate a negotiation.  
 Interestingly, researchers have demonstrated that women negotiate differently in 
online environments as virtual interactions often provide users with few visual and social 
cues about the characteristics of the individual (Walther, 1996), including characteristics 
such as gender. Stuhlmacher, Citera, and Willis (2007) conducted a meta-analysis in 
which they examined gender differences in virtual negotiations then compared this with 
face-to-face negotiations. Results demonstrated that women were significantly more 
hostile in online negotiations in comparison to face-to-face negotiations, while men were 
equally hostile online as they were face-to-face. While the studies varied in their degree 
of anonymity, it seems that any minimization of gender cues allows for women to behave 
in ways that are atypical of traditional gender norms. The authors suggest that in online 
environments women are less inhibited by prescribed social roles and thus can focus on 
task demands rather the tending to relationship demands. Similarly, other researchers 
have demonstrated that as anonymity increases, both male and female negotiators 
correspondingly increase their hostility (Stuhlmacher & Citera, 2005). Taken together, 
gender norms and social roles present women with a complex dilemma when deciding 
whether or not to negotiate, while men encounter few points of contention. It is then no 
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surprise that women often conform to the widely held expectation that “nice girls don't 
ask” (Babcock & Laschever, 2003, p. 62).    
Styles of Conflict Management 
Individuals commonly adopt diverse strategies for coping with conflict, and these 
styles can significantly vary from one person to the next. One widely used taxonomy for 
measuring conflict style is the Thomas-Kilmann scale (1974), which outlines five styles 
of interpersonal conflict management. According to the scale, the five conflict styles 
include competing, compromising avoiding, accommodating, and collaborating. These 
conflict styles range in their degree of concern for oneself and concern for the other party. 
A competitive style exudes the most concern for oneself and the least concern for others. 
A compromising style is both assertive and cooperative and aims to find a solution that 
meets “in the middle” to satisfy the needs of both parties. An avoidance style of conflict 
is one, which the individual deflects, withdraws, or postpones engaging in conflict; thus 
an avoidance style is neither an assertive nor competitive. An accommodating style is one 
in which the individual neglects one's personal needs and interests to satiate the needs of 
one's counterpart. A collaborating style is both assertive and cooperative, but utilizes 
superior communication skills to work with the other party in order to completely and 
creatively meet the needs of all.  
Most contemporary literatures suggest that a collaborative style is the most 
effective strategy for building a trusting relationship with your negotiation counterpart. 
That said, most scholars agree that there is no single best conflict style, but competent 
negotiators are those who can effectively select the most appropriate style for the given 
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situation. In other words, each style of negotiation style is effective in a particular 
situation (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974).  
 Some research suggests that conflict style is different for women and men, and 
these differences tend to align with stereotypical gender roles. Specifically, women are 
more likely to adopt an accommodating style while men are more likely to adopt a 
competitive or avoidance style (Greeff & de Bruyne, 2000). Rubin and Brown (1975) 
were among the first to propose that women and men have different goals when faced 
with conflict: women are concerned with interpersonal relationships while men are 
concerned with maximizing their earnings. However, research findings that followed 
have posited that gender and conflict style is more complex than the generalization that 
women accommodate and men compete.  
Research with managerial samples has demonstrated that there are no gender 
differences in conflict style. That is, female managers have been shown to adopt conflict 
styles similar to male managers (Eagly & Johnson, 1990; Watson & Hoffman, 1996), 
likely because female managers experience significant power and are encouraged and 
expected to adopt styles similar to men (Brewer, Mitchell, & Weber, 2002). These 
findings suggest that gender differences in conflict styles are inconstant and wax and 
wane depending on the specific situation.  
Indeed, meta-analyses have demonstrated that gender differences in negotiation 
are either minimal or altogether absent (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters, 
Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). These findings, combined with the contrasting evidence 
that perceived psychological power is influential for women but not for men, led scholars 
to more closely examine how research is being conducted and how variables are being 
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operationalized. Kolb (2012) has urged gender researchers to more clearly label their 
methodological approach and theoretical perspective so that meaningful comparisons can 
be made between results and conclusions. It is only through clearly describing the 
parameters of our research investigations that we can come closer to agreement about the 
effects of gender in negotiation (Deaux & Major, 1987). Indeed, the diversity of the 
negotiation literature has made it difficult to formulate sound conclusions (Kray & 
Thompson, 2004). Methodologically, research studies vary with regard to a) the type of 
negotiation, b) the composition of the dyad, and c) the outcome measure of interest. First, 
the type of negotiation largely influences gender differences in research findings. For 
example, prisoner dilemma negotiations (a negotiation in which individual gains are 
maximize through minimizing the gains of one's opponent) are exceedingly different 
interactions than integrative negotiations (gains are maximized by cooperatively 
exploring joint interests), and will involve different types of social strategies (Morgan & 
Tindale, 2002). Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999) demonstrated that men are more 
successful in distributive negotiations, though only slightly better in integrative 
negotiations. Other research has demonstrated that in integrative negotiations women are 
better able to identify integrative potential (Halpern & McLean Parks, 1996). Second, the 
composition of the negotiation dyad is a key factor in understanding gender effects, and 
is particularly complex. For example, in some studies female-female dyads have been 
demonstrated to be more competitive than all other group compositions (Hottes & Kahn, 
1974) and to be more exploitative (Instone, Major & Bunker, 1983). In other instances, 
men have also been shown to be competitive with other men but then decrease their 
competitiveness when negotiating with other females, likely to demonstrate admirable 
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qualities of chivalry (Burford, Foley, Rollins, & Rosario, 1996). Hence, the gender 
composition of the dyad is another complex but misunderstood factor that influences 
gender effects in a negotiation. Lastly, the outcome measures vary widely from one study 
to the next, with some studies measuring individual gains (Barron, 2003; Bowles et al., 
2004), others measuring joint gains (Miles & LaSalle, 2009), and yet others measuring 
relational factors (Halpern & McClean Parks, 1996; King & Hinson, 1994). It has been 
suggested that researchers most commonly investigate economic outcomes of 
negotiations, largely overlooking relational outcomes, thus privileging a masculine 
negotiation paradigm (Putnam & Kolb, 2000). In addition, an array of methodological 
approaches have been used from one study to the next, making it extraordinarily difficult 
to compare and contrast research findings and formulate sound conclusions. Thus, 
women and men are oriented towards conflict rather distinctly and comparing the two is a 
complex endeavor.  
Gender and the Propensity to Negotiate 
 Despite the diversity of the negotiation research, the source of gender differences 
are consistently conceptualized as relating to individual-level and situational-level factors 
(Kolb, 2012; Rubin & Brown, 1975). Individual-level factors position gender effects as a 
consequence of factors related to the negotiator. Situational-level factors explain gender-
effects as a consequence of factors external to the negotiator. Given the conceptual merit 
of these factors, individual and situational factors will be used in the literature review to 
explore the relevant theory and empirical evidence surrounding the propensity to 
negotiate.  
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Individual-Level Factors 
Gender differences have been long been considered at the individual-level (e.g., 
Rubin & Brown, 1975) and considered to be a fixed trait. This approach views these 
individual traits as mostly stable and constant, meaning that most women will act 
similarly to other women while most men will act similarly to other men. Further, it is 
believed that these gender differences cause differences in the propensity to negotiate. 
The individual-level traits most frequently proposed to cause gender effects in the 
propensity to negotiate include relational orientation, locus of control, risk-aversion, and 
the recognition of opportunities (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Babcock et al., 2006; 
Rubin & Brown, 1975). 
 Relational orientation. One assumed individual-level difference between women 
in men is their degree of relational orientation. Relational orientation or relational self-
construal is described as the degree to which individuals perceive themselves to be 
interconnected with other people. Those with a high relational orientation perceive 
themselves as interconnected with other people and understand themselves in relation to 
others. On the other hand, those with a low relational orientation perceive themselves as 
disjointed or independent from others (Cross & Madson, 1997).  
 It has been argued that women and men develop somewhat different relational 
orientations as part of their role identities. Relational orientation is tied to gender norms 
that outline a male standard of dominance over others and a female standard of concern 
for others (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997; Curhan, Neale, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 
2008; Gardner, Gabriel, & Dean, 2004). This schema includes a basic understanding or 
prescription of how women and men should behave in relation to others (Bem, 1981). 
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Indeed, evidence suggests that women are more likely to perceive their identities and 
actions as more closely intertwined with the people around them (Cross & Madson, 1997; 
Rubin & Brown, 1975) and are also more concerned with social relationships (Fiske, 
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Gender differences in relational orientation have been found 
to occur at the negotiation table as well. A study by Halpern and McClean Parks (1996) 
demonstrated that women and men had different relational concerns while negotiating. In 
the study, participants were asked to negotiate over the funding arrangements of a 
children's playground project. The researchers then conducted a content analysis of the 
audio transcripts of negotiation interactions; findings demonstrated that men were more 
likely to assert their self-interests, make demands, and mention money much sooner than 
women. Women, on the other hand, were more likely to ask questions about the other's 
feelings and were concerned how the joint decision would affect other people. In this 
instance, relational concerns were a prominent consideration for women while economic 
concerns were at the forefront of concerns for men.  
 Relational concerns for women could hamper their likelihood of pursuing 
economic interests. Broadly, those with a high relational orientation may adopt behaviors 
of 'relational accommodation,' meaning they minimize or forgo economic gains in order 
to pursue relational goals (Curhan et al., 2008). If it is accepted that women have a higher 
relational orientation (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997; Rubin & Brown, 1975), then women 
might then have a particularly difficult time at the negotiation table, which typically 
involves both economic and relational elements (Mnookin et al., 2000). Women might be 
more willing to undervalue their economic interests in an effort to 'accommodate' to 
others and preserve their relationships (Kolb & Coolidge, 1988). In other words, female 
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negotiators may consider both relational and economic concerns while men are focally 
concerned with economic issues. Consequently, the multiple, often conflicting, interests 
of women could hinder their economic pursuits (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). Indeed, 
there is such evidence to support the occurrence of gender differences in relational 
concerns when distributing pay. For instance, one study asked individuals if they felt 
comfortable being paid more than others in the group. Male participants in this study had 
no qualms with being paid more, while female participants reported a high level of 
discomfort with receiving higher pay than others (Barron, 2003). In other words, while 
men have a focal interest in their own personal gains, women are more likely to consider 
how their personal gains affect the relative gains of others.  
 In brief, a variety of research supports the belief that there are gender differences 
in relational orientations. Women often take interest in both relational and economic 
outcomes, while men often fixate their attention on economic interests. Therefore, the 
decision to negotiate may be somewhat trickier for women, which could lead them to 
either undervalue or ignore their own interests. Consequently, gender differences in the 
propensity to negotiate could be the result of differences in relational orientation and 
consideration of other people.  
 Locus of control. Locus of control has long been studied and has been implicated 
as a factor that influences the propensity to negotiate (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). 
Locus of control is described as the extent to which individuals perceive they are 
personally in control of their circumstances (Rotter, 1966). Those with a high external 
locus of control generally believe that external factors, such as luck, chance, or other 
people, control their life circumstances and future. Those with a high internal locus 
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believe that they are personally in control of their lives and futures. It is no surprise, then, 
that individuals with a high internal locus of control are more likely to be assertive 
(Hartwig, Dickson, & Anderson, 1980) since they believe that they have the ability to 
attain the things they desire.  
Notable gender differences have been found between women and men with regard 
to locus of control. Researchers consistently find that, on average, women maintain a 
higher external locus of control than do men (Kunhikrishnan & Manikandan, 1995; 
Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1997), and this gender difference extends to many 
countries beyond the United States (Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1997). For example, 
a study by Barron (2003) demonstrated that men perceived themselves as largely in 
control of determining their financial value and were also more certain of their personal 
value. Conversely, women believed their employer should determine their economic 
value and were also more uncertain of their personal worth. 
These gender differences in locus of control have important implications for 
negotiations, particularly in wage negotiations. Individuals with a high external locus of 
control, who believe they exert less control over their life and circumstances, may be less 
likely to exert effort towards initiating a negotiation. If a negotiator believes her or his 
efforts will not influence the outcome, then there is little motivation to act. Indeed, 
negotiators with a higher internal locus of control are more likely to be competitive and 
more likely to decline poor first offers in wage negotiations (Ford, 1983). Therefore, 
women might be less likely to initiate a negotiation because they believe others should 
and can determine their worth (Babcock & Laschever, 2003).  
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Risk-taking and risk-aversion. Gender differences in propensity could also be 
the result of variances in risk-taking behavior, with men more likely to engage in risky 
behaviors in comparison to women. These gender differences in risk-taking behavior 
might help explain why women are more averse to the thought of 'negotiating' in 
comparison to men (Small et al., 2007). Some have explained that the male proclivity for 
risk-taking behavior is an attribute of male psychology and they are driven to attain social 
and economic rewards (Wilson & Daly, 1985). Others have suggested that male risk-
taking is partly a function of sensation-seeking and is fostered by supportive gender 
norms in the given culture (Arnett, 1992). While there is not yet a definitive explanation 
for why there are gender differences in risk-taking, there is evidence to suggest that these 
gender differences exist.   
Indeed, evidence supports that men are more comfortable with risk than women 
(Arch, 1993). A meta-analysis conducted by Byrnes, Miller, and Schafner (1999) 
demonstrated that men are more likely to engage in risk-taking behaviors across 14 out of 
16 tasks including driving, sexual activities, gambling, and intellectual risk endeavors. 
This same study also demonstrated that gender differences in risk-taking are nuanced; the 
degree of difference varies depending on age and context. For example, gender 
differences in risky sexual behavior are wide in younger age groups but these gender 
differences narrow as age increases. In comparison, gender differences in risky drinking 
and drug use are narrow among younger age groups and are quite large with older age 
groups. Interestingly, males were likely to engage in risk-taking behaviors even when it 
was discernible that the risky behavior is a poor idea. Conversely, females were unlikely 
to engage in risk-taking behaviors even when it was a good idea to engage in the risk. 
21 
Thus, risk-taking is either adaptive or maladaptive, depending on the benefits or 
consequences that are attained in these various endeavors.  
Gender differences in risk-taking have also been identified in negotiations. While 
Craver and Barnes (1999) reported no gender differences in the negotiation performances 
of their law students, their research also reported that the women in eight out of the 11 
negotiation courses opted to enroll in the elective class for no credit to avoid the potential 
risk of earning a bad grade for subpar performance. It seems women, but not men, 
preferred to avoid risk in the negotiation course and this factor might explain the findings 
by Craver and Barnes (1999) as to why women negotiated at a rate comparable to men.  
Recognizing opportunities and experience. Recognizing the opportunity to 
negotiate is an essential step if a negotiation is to occur (Volkema & Fleck, 2012). The 
way an individual understands negotiation will influence her/his propensity to negotiate. 
If one does not perceive him/herself to be amidst an interaction that is negotiable, then 
one is far less likely to make efforts to initiate a negotiation. Research suggests that men 
are more likely than women to recognize opportunities to negotiate. In an online survey, 
Babcock and her colleagues (2006) asked over 200 women and men to describe their last 
two negotiations and their next two negotiations. The study found gender differences in 
both arenas: estimated time until the respondents' next negotiation as well as time since 
their last negotiation. In predicting the time until their next negotiation, male participants 
reported they would negotiate much sooner than female participants predicted they would 
negotiate. On average, men indicated their next negotiation would take place in seven 
days while women reported their next negotiation would take place in thirty days. 
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Overwhelmingly, men expected to be negotiating much sooner than women expected to 
be negotiating.   
Recognizing negotiation opportunities was also strongly related to the frequency 
of actual negotiation experiences. In the second part of their study, Babcock et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that men reported negotiating more recently than did women. On average, 
men stated they had negotiated in the last two weeks, while women said they had 
negotiated in the last month. There were also vast gender differences in the second-most-
recent negotiation. The second-most recent negotiation took place seven weeks prior for 
men, and six months prior for women. The researchers suggest that these gender 
differences in experience could have devastating consequences for women. Without 
recognizing negotiation opportunities or having extensive negotiating experience, women 
might struggle to gain the skills or self-efficacy (Bandura, 1984, 1986) that are necessary 
requisites to becoming an effective negotiator.  
 Taken together, gender differences in the propensity to negotiate can be 
considered a function of a number of individual-level differences. The prominent 
individual differences that have been examined include relational orientation, locus of 
control, risk-taking, and recognizing opportunities to negotiate and experience doing so. 
Indeed, these individual differences have been successful in predicting behaviors related 
to the propensity to negotiate (Babcock & Lashever, 2003; Babcock et al., 2006; Curhan 
et al., 2008; Halpern & McClean Parks, 1996). That said, evidence exists to support the 
belief that the gender story is slightly more complex than individual-level differences. 
While individual-level factors are important in the propensity to negotiate (Volkema & 
Fleck, 2012), human behavior is at minimum a function of both individual variables and 
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situational constraints on that behavior (McCroskey, 1997). In fact, many scholars have 
suggested that individual differences can only account for a small amount of the gender 
differences in negotiation behavior, and situational factors are paramount to accounting 
for much of the variance between women and men (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; 
Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998). Watson (1994) argues that “It appears that even 
small variations in experimental conditions can eliminate these [gender] differences 
entirely, or more surprisingly, cause them to change direction” (p. 23). Thus, gender 
differences can be triggered or changed by alterations to the situation. Consequently, the 
propensity to negotiate is optimally understood by considering both individual-level 
variables as well as situational factors that might influence these individual differences. 
The next section will discuss the situational factors in negotiations that influence gender 
effects in the propensity to negotiate. 
Situational-Level Factors 
The situational approach assumes that women and men are similar and behave 
similarly in negotiations; however situational factors can cause sex differences to emerge. 
The situational factors known to trigger gender differences in the propensity to negotiate 
include role congruence, stereotype activation, perceived power, and structural 
ambiguity.   
Role congruence. One situational factor related to gender effects is role 
congruity. As previously described, a role is congruent when it is consistent with 
traditional norms for a particular gender, while the role is incongruent when the role is 
inconsistent with the norms for one's gender (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Both women and 
men are more liked when they behave in ways that are gender-consistent (Rudman, 
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1998). Indeed, there can be negative social consequences when gender norms are violated 
(Bem, 1981; Cherry & Deaux, 1978; Cross & Madson, 1997; Rubin & Brown, 1975). For 
example, women in particular can incur social backlash when they are “not nice” 
(Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001; Wade, 2001) or when they exert behaviors such as 
assertiveness or self-promotion (Rudman, 1998).  
The congruity between the role and the sex of the negotiator can affect the 
propensity to negotiate in two ways. First, role incongruity in a negotiation can cause 
negative social responses or backlash from others. Bowles, Babcock, and Lai (2007) 
found women often incur a higher social cost for negotiating in comparison to men. In 
their study, they asked a sample of college students to adopt the role of manager and then 
evaluate the profiles of internal job candidates; some of these candidates were attempting 
to negotiate their starting salary while others were not. Results demonstrated that women 
were consistently punished for negotiating their starting wage. Specifically, women who 
negotiated were rated as competent, but they were also rated as demanding, less likable, 
and less hirable. In comparison, men did not experience negative consequences for 
negotiating. Men who negotiated were rated as equally likable, similarly demanding, and 
were perceived as equally hirable in comparison to men who did not negotiate. Second, 
women seem to understand they are behaving in ways incongruent with gender norms 
when they negotiate and anticipate that they will encounter backlash. The aforementioned 
study by Bowles et al. (2007) also asked participants to reverse their role and adopt the 
role of the negotiator. The female participants correctly anticipated that there would be 
social consequences for negotiating, were more apprehensive about the idea of 
negotiating, and consequently were less likely to initiate negotiations (Bowles, et al., 
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2007). In other words, women knew quite well that their requests would be met with 
pushback from others and therefore they chose to avoid negotiating.  
 On the other hand, women are unlikely to encounter backlash when the 
negotiation scenario is more congruent with female norms. For example, women fare 
much better when negotiating for others rather than negotiating for themselves. 
Negotiating for oneself is viewed as pursuing self-interests, a behavior inconsistent with 
traditional feminine norms of selflessness. Negotiating for others, however, is consistent 
with female stereotypes as it is considered an expression of care for others (Wade, 2001). 
Further, women expect less backlash when negotiating on behalf of a friend than when 
negotiating for themselves (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). Not only do women avoid 
backlash during gender-appropriate negotiations, but they also perform better. For 
example, women are generally are more assertive and achieve higher outcomes when 
they are negotiating on the behalf of others. Bowles et al. (2005) found that when women 
advocate for others they set higher goals and make higher initial offers in comparison to 
when negotiating on their own behalf. Interestingly, men set similar goals and opening 
offers regardless of whether they are negotiating for themselves or others. Together these 
studies suggest that female negotiators have to consider the perceived and actual social 
consequences of negotiating when deciding whether to initiate a negotiation. As such, for 
women, the risks of negotiating need to be carefully calculated and the rewards might not 
always outweigh the costs. However, male negotiators face few social risks and have 
everything to gain.  
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Negotiation frame. Another negotiation situation that affects the propensity to 
negotiate is the way the interaction is framed. Deborah Small and her colleagues (2007) 
used an experimental design in which they informed half their participants they could 
'negotiate' for more money while the other half were told they could 'ask' for more 
money. Drawing from politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987), the researchers 
contend that 'asking' is more appropriate than 'negotiating' for those with low social 
power and that women more often hold low power positions. Therefore, a negotiation 
frame of 'asking' is more gender-congruent than 'negotiating'. Indeed, their study 
demonstrated that female participants perceived 'negotiating' as significantly more 
intimidating than 'asking'. However, men perceived 'negotiating' and 'asking' as similarly 
unintimidating. A subsequent experiment demonstrated that these negative perceptions 
indeed translated into gender differences in behavior. That is, women were more likely to 
negotiate when they were told they could 'ask' for more money in comparison to being 
told they could 'negotiate' for more money. Conversely, for men, there were no 
differences in the propensity to 'ask' and the propensity to 'negotiate'. In sum, the way the 
interaction was framed had an effect on women's perceptions and behaviors but did not 
effect men.  
Stereotype activation. While it is well-known that a 'successful' negotiator uses 
an array of stylistic approaches (Mnookin et al., 2000; Shell, 2001), negotiators are more 
commonly perceived as possessing masculine traits. The stereotype of a negotiator more 
commonly includes traits that are masculine; negotiators are expected to be strong, 
assertive, and rational (Raiffa, 1982). Therefore, by default, men often experience an 
advantage because they align with the characteristics of a typical negotiator (Kray et al., 
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2002). However, when gender is cued in the negotiation, implicitly or explicitly, it can 
significantly influence the way the negotiation unfolds.  
 Implicit stereotypes are not overtly stated but are simply implied and occur below 
immediate consciousness. These implicit stereotypes cause individuals to fulfill the 
gender stereotype, thus causing men to increase their behavior while women will 
decrease their behavior. For example, an implicit or subtle cue that men are more 
effective negotiators has been shown to result in improved outcomes for men decreased 
outcomes for women (Kray, et al., 2001). On the other hand, cuing a female advantage 
benefits women and penalizes men. When a successful negotiator is described as 
possessing stereotypically feminine traits, verbal adeptness and listening skills, the 
performance of women increases and the performance of men decreases (Kray, et al., 
2002). Essentially, when a context implies that a certain gender will have an advantage, 
that gender indeed negotiates better outcomes.  
 Explicit cues are signals about gender difference that are openly or overtly stated, 
and they trigger a psychological reaction in which the individual rejects or counter the 
stereotype. The negative reaction to the stereotype can actually cause women to increase 
their performance and attain better outcomes. Explicitly or overtly cueing women to the 
masculine traits associated with negotiation has been shown to increase negotiation 
performance for women. One study demonstrated that when women were explicitly cued 
of a male advantage, the women reacted by behaving inconsistent with the feminine 
stereotype (Kray et al., 2001). In sum, subtle cues cause individuals to behave consistent 
with norms and explicit cues cause to reject and defy these norms.  
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 Stereotype activation might explain why some researchers have found minimal 
gender differences in negotiations. Law Professor Charles Craver has been tracking his 
students' performance on in-class negotiation activities, with a particular interest in 
comparing negotiated outcomes of women and men. The first half of the semester 
Craver's students learn about various aspects of negotiation including topics such as 
communication, the various phases, relational issues, techniques, as well as gender role 
expectations. The second half of the semester involves five scored/graded negotiation 
exercises. Over the course of 16 semesters, there was only one year that gender correlated 
with negotiation performance. Therefore, for most of the years, gender had no 
relationship with performance. Craver suggests that gender differences might not relate to 
negotiation outcomes amongst a sample of law students that are both intelligent and 
competitive (Craver, 2002). Craver's work, however, might not demonstrate gender 
equality but instead might demonstrate the immense value of education for triggering 
gender reactance to explicit gender cues.  
 The perception of power. Gender and power dynamics can influence the 
negotiation experience in a number of ways as well (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010), 
including whether one initiates a negotiation (Small et al., 2007). Power is central to 
negotiation and is a function of who has control over the desired resource(s) or the ability 
to leave the table altogether (Volkema, 2009). Further, power can provide an individual 
with the leverage and bravado to competitively pursue higher outcomes (Kanter, 1977). 
However, gender stereotypes assume that women maintain lower positions of status and 
power than men (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Eagly & Wood, 1982; Kanter, 
1977). In addition, women typically do have less societal power (Henley & LaFrance, 
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1984) and are more sparsely represented in most positions of power, whereas men are 
often perceived as powerful and have long dominated leadership positions (Fireman, 
1990). That said, much of power is perceptual and therefore is far from fixed or finite 
(Coleman, 2006). Situational manipulations can alter the amount of perceived power that 
a negotiator experiences and, consequently, their propensity to initiate a negotiation.  
 One study by Small et al. (2007) demonstrates that perceived power strongly 
relates to the propensity to negotiate, especially for women. This lab study involved 149 
participants, half of whom were primed to think and write about a time they perceived 
themselves as powerful, while the other half received no such power cue. When women 
were primed to feel powerful, they negotiated at a rate that was comparable to men. The 
rate of negotiating for men, however, did not change between the power condition and 
non-power condition. Thus, it is likely that women need to be reminded to experience 
power while men inherently experience feelings of power by nature of simply being a 
man. Given that women experience lower feelings of power relative to men, it seems this 
perception hampers their propensity to negotiate. Similar to other research (i.e., Watson, 
1994), this study implies that when female negotiators experience a reasonable amount of 
perceived power they are more likely to initiate negotiations and will do so at a rate 
comparable to men. 
 Ambiguity. Clarity in negotiation conditions can have a profound influence on 
behavior and the propensity to negotiate (Kray & Gelfand, 2009; Volkema, 2009). Clarity 
in a situation can be understood as ranging from “strong” to “weak” (Mischel, 1977). 
Strong situations provide the same clear message to all participants on the type of 
behavior that is appropriate. These strong situations heavily influence the individual to 
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behave consistently with the expected and normative behavior. In comparison, weak 
situations provide little information regarding how one should behave. Negotiation 
situations often range in clarity regarding factors such as whether pay is negotiable or 
how pay is determined (Volkema, 2009).  
 Individual differences, such as gender differences, are more likely to emerge in 
weak situations. Weak situations often trigger individual differences because behavior 
will need to be improvised using internal cues such as traits and beliefs (Snyder & Ickes, 
1985). Gender norms provide a rich source of information regarding what behaviors are 
socially acceptable (Eagly, 1987) in an ambiguous negotiation (Bowles, 2012; Bowles et 
al., 2005). For example, women have been demonstrated to have lower pay expectations 
than do men, but gender differences in expectations are eradicated when the procedures 
of pay determination are made available (Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984). Thus, 
clarity in regards to acceptable and normative behavior strongly influences the extent that 
gender effects are triggered.  
Structural ambiguity is the extent to which the parameters of the negotiation are 
clear to the negotiators. The structure of the negotiation refers to the specific economic 
structure of the negotiation and involves factors such as what is specifically negotiable, 
the bargaining range, and what constitutes a fair agreement. Indeed, ambiguity in the 
environment has been suggested as an important predictor of the propensity to negotiate 
(Volkema & Fleck, 2012), particularly for women.  
One compelling study by Bowles et al. (2005) surveyed graduating MBA students 
and asked them to report a series of details on their work experience and salary 
information. Findings suggest there were no gender differences in pay within professions 
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of low ambiguity regarding pay, professions such as consulting, investment banking, and 
venture capital. However, men earned $10,000 more per year than women in highly 
ambiguous industries, industries such as telecommunications, manufacturing, and 
health/human services. Upon further investigation, the researchers determined that the 
wage differences in ambiguous industries were tied to the avoidance of negotiating 
starting salaries. In sum, ambiguous situations leave room for individual differences to be 
elicited -- individual differences such as gender or the traits that accompany gender (i.e., 
relational orientation, locus of control, risk-taking, recognizing opportunities). Further, 
these differences are typically more financially harmful to women, who often do not 
negotiate, than men, who often do negotiate. It has been suggested that organizations 
could minimize the wage gap by creating transparency surrounding what is negotiable 
and how pay decisions are made. With transparency, differences in pay are more likely to 
be the result of merit rather than individual differences such as gender (Konnikova, 2014; 
Pradel, Bowles, & McGinn, 2005).  
Negotiation counterpart. One of the initial examinations of gender differences in 
the propensity to negotiate targeted apprehension as a main factor contributing to gender 
differences in the propensity to negotiate (Babcock et al., 2006). Indeed, apprehension or 
nervousness has been identified as an important factor in the propensity to negotiate, both 
broadly (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011; Volkema & Fleck, 2009) and for women 
specifically (Babcock et al., 2006). Recent support has been found that women 
experience high levels of nervousness surrounding negotiating. For example, a study by 
Kray and Gelfand (2009) found that women expressed greater relief when they had a first 
offer accepted in a negotiation, while men expressed more regret that they were not able 
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to negotiate for more. However, other researchers have suggested that gender differences 
in apprehension are marginal (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). These inconclusive findings 
have led scholars to more closely evaluate the situations in which apprehension differs 
between women and men. One factor that has been linked to apprehension is the 
negotiation counterpart, in large part due to the real or imagined social consequences of 
negotiating.  
The composition of the gender dyad has been demonstrated to have a profound 
effect on nervousness and the propensity to negotiate. Bowles et al. (2007) demonstrated 
that females were more hesitant to negotiate with a male counterpart, and nervousness 
explained this hesitation. Indeed, in this same study it was demonstrated that women who 
negotiated experienced consistent backlash from male evaluators, whereas the backlash 
from female evaluators only occurred under certain conditions. Specifically, women 
punished women when they negotiated in writing, but there was no punishment for 
negotiations proposed in a video recording. While the researchers are unclear why the 
communication medium has an effect on the evaluations that are made, it is suggested 
that females consistently experience more pushback from males. In fact, female 
negotiators consistently predict there will be consequences for negotiating, and indeed are 
correct in their predictions. Thus, female negotiators who encounter male counterparts 
often experience nervousness and are then hesitant to initiate a negotiation, and their 
perceptions and behaviors are somewhat justified given that they are likely to experience 
negative social consequences. In sum, nervousness is minimally a byproduct and 
potentially a demotivating factor in the propensity to negotiate.  
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 Interestingly, other researchers have demonstrated that the influence of one's 
counterpart is more complex than 'men make women nervous, so they don't negotiate'. A 
study by Erikkson and Sanders (2012) demonstrated that the opposite effect can occur. In 
their study, female participants were more reluctant to negotiate with other women, likely 
for fear of damaging the relationship. This study differed from the Bowles' study in that 
the interactions were face-to-face and the exchange was framed as an ongoing 
relationship in which the parties were likely to interact again in the future.  
  Erikkson and Sanders (2012) suggest that women may have been more likely to 
negotiate with men in their study because there were no indicators or signals of status 
between the participants and the applicants. Without a cue regarding status, women 
negotiated at a rate comparable to men. The influence of status in negotiating is 
consistent with other scholarship suggesting that negotiation counterparts who are 
perceived as unapproachable or extremely powerful are viewed as threatening and are 
therefore avoided (Volkema, 2009). In sum, when exploring gender differences in the 
propensity to negotiate, it is important to consider the gender composition of the dyad as 
well as power and relational dynamics.   
Summary of the Literature Review 
The preceding section described the literature related to gender differences in the 
propensity to negotiate and did so within the framework of individual-level differences 
and situational-level factors. Both individual-level factors and situational factors may 
account for gender effects in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. Individual-level 
factors are viewed as relatively stable and relate to whether one perceives the initiation of 
a negotiation to be an appropriate or effective course of action. Specific individual-level 
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factors related to gender include relational orientation, locus of control, and the 
recognition of opportunities. Situational factors are episodic factors that affect one's 
perception of whether one should negotiate (Volkema & Fleck, 2012). Role congruence, 
perceived power, and structural ambiguity are situational factors that have been deemed 
relevant for understanding gender effects in the propensity to negotiate. While individual 
and situational approaches have been valuable in describing some of the factors that 
relate to gender effects in negotiation, the previous work really has yet to provide a 
coherent framework that allows room for both individual and situational factors to be 
explored.   
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this study is comprised of two main elements; 
sensemaking and problematic integration theory. The first phase, the quantitative phase, 
is not driven by a particular theory, per se, but instead replicates a laboratory study 
developed by Small et al. (2007) to explore the relationship between gender and the 
propensity to negotiate. The second phase of this study, the qualitative phase, is broadly 
guided by Weick's articulation of sensemaking (Weick, 1977, 1995) and more closely 
guided by Babrow's theory of Problematic Integration (1992, 1995, 2001). Sensemaking 
and PI are appropriate theoretical frameworks because they both address unclear 
situations and consider how individuals choose to address or cope with that lack of 
clarity. Sensemaking proposes that uncertainty (absence of meaning) and ambiguity 
(confusion of meaning) are resolved by drawing from ongoing flows of co-constructed 
information (Weick, 1995). That is, sense is made with others and is never complete. 
Problematic integration proposes that when faced with uncertainty, individuals formulate 
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probabilistic and evaluative judgments of that object, and then either choose action or 
inertia. Together, sensemaking and PI share many similar positions. Sensemaking and PI 
both maintain that decision-making is more complex than accuracy and choosing the best 
option; instead, actions are often taken because they are feasible, accessible, and socially 
acceptable. Additionally, both sensemaking and PI rest upon the notion that the 
construction of meaning is a communicative, social process and is, therefore, dynamic 
and ever-changing (McPhee & Zaug, 2001).  
 While sensemaking and PI share many of the same foundational assumptions, PI 
provides a more nuanced view of uncertainty. Specifically, sensemaking presupposes that 
the goal is to reduce uncertainty (or equivocality) and it is through social processes that 
individuals maintain or increase access to information (Feldman, 1989). PI, however, 
supposes that coping with uncertainty is more complex than merely reducing uncertainty. 
At times, according to PI, the reduction of uncertainty is not always possible or desirable. 
Moreover, increasing uncertainty can allow room for hope and optimism. For example, 
an individual diagnosed with late-stage terminal cancer might cling to sparse notions of 
hope to transform their PI of death, an event that likely has a high probability and a 
negative evaluation (Babrow, 2001).  
These theoretical delineations of uncertainty fit well within the context of a 
negotiation. For example, individuals avoid negotiations when they expect rejection but 
confidently approach interactions when they expect success (Bowles et al., 2005; 
Volkema, 2009). Depending on the negotiation, either uncertainty reduction or 
uncertainty augmentation could be the foremost objective. Therefore, both of these two 
theoretical approaches are potentially useful in examining how individuals explain their 
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propensity to negotiate. The theoretical foundation for this study binds the ideas of 
ambiguity and communication as foundational to the negotiation process, and the 
relevance of each of these concepts merit consideration. 
 Sensemaking and PI are useful for investigating the propensity to negotiate, given 
that negotiation is a process that is rife with ambiguity and substantiated with 
communication. Foremost, negotiations present the negotiator with many instances of 
ambiguity. Negotiation has oft been described as an art that involves both mathematical 
and human elements (Raiffa, 1982). That is, in addition to economic issues of allocating 
resources, negotiations are fundamentally social endeavors with one or more parties that 
have vested interest in those particular resources. With both parties expectedly interested 
in claiming sufficient value, negotiations have the potential to become more competitive 
than cooperative, thereby leading to deception, threats, or secrecy (Strudler, 1995). As a 
result, the negotiation process is intensely uncertain. Uncertainty can surround the other 
parties interests, bargaining ranges, and alternatives to reaching an agreement. To 
overcome issues of uncertainty and ensure a fair deal, negotiators are trained to use 
forethought to understand the dynamics of the negotiation table, build trust to encourage 
information exchange between parties, then reflection to understand the negotiation in 
novel ways (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Mnookin, et al., 2000; Putnam & Kolb, 2000; 
Schoop, et al., 2010; Shell, 2006; Ury, 1993). Thus, ambiguity is commonly encountered 
in a negotiation but can be reduced through communicative processes.  
 Communication is the constitutive material of negotiation as, “Negotiation cannot 
occur without some means of communication” (Putnam & Roloff, 1992, p. 1). 
Negotiators communicate using verbal and nonverbal messages to make offers, 
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counteroffers, demands, threats, and promises (Putnam, 2010). Through communication, 
negotiators are able to engage in collaborative problem-solving to mutually craft a 
beneficial agreement (Putnam & Roloff, 1992). A communicative approach to 
negotiation acknowledges that multiple systems of meaning underlie bargaining. 
Individual negotiators maintain personal understandings and expectations of the 
exchange, the negotiators co-create meaning throughout their exchange, and negotiation 
situations are imbued with meaning surrounding what constitutes normative behavior for 
a given situation. Further, societal meanings of power and politics provide scripts 
surrounding a given negotiation context. Therefore, communication can both reveal and 
constrain various types of information in the negotiation exchange. Due to the centrality 
of language and communication to negotiation, it has been argued that communication 
has a central role in the bargaining process (Putnam, 2010). Communication theory, such 
as sensemaking and PI, provide an opportunity to consider how communication fosters or 
inhibits the propensity to initiate a negotiation. The following section will more 
specifically describe sensemaking and PI and then detail the relevance of each of these 
theories for the present study.  
Sensemaking 
Sensemaking occurs when there is an absence of meaning (uncertainty) or 
multiple meanings are available (equivocality). Ultimately, a situation is presented that 
necessitates meaning to be made, and sensemaking is the process of understanding. 
Importantly, sensemaking can occur at the individual or organizational level. At an 
individual-level, people construct an understanding of the situation or their environment 
(Weick, 1995). At a group or organizational level, individuals make sense socially, which 
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involves making sense together and formulating mutual understanding of a given 
situation (Weick & Roberts, 1993). As a theoretical lens, sensemaking is useful for 
considering the ways meaning is constructed at these levels of understanding; the 
individual, the group, and/or the organization (Weick, 1995). For example, Wrzesniewski 
(2003) argued that individuals often assign meaning to their work through multiple levels 
of relational sensemaking processes. Specifically, the value and meaning of one's work is 
constructed through interactions with others at work. Meaning or sense is made 
relationally and through conversations and observations of others such as customers, 
subordinates, colleagues, and supervisors. To describe sensemaking simply, it is the 
process of 'making sense' of events or situations through a collective social process in 
order to determine what should be done next (Weick, 1977).  
 The foundation of organizational sensemaking is composed of seven core 
properties (Weick, 1995). First, sensemaking is bound to identity; meaning that the way 
we make sense of the world is largely tied to our own self-conceptualization. Weick 
states “Once I know who I am, then I know what is out there.” (1995, p. 20). Further, 
one's identity influences and potentially the scripts, or recipes for action, that are 
available to enact (Golden, Kirby, & Jorgenson. 2006). Second, sensemaking is a 
retrospective process. This retrospective process contrasts with many cognitive theories 
that argue thoughts lead to action; instead, sensemaking posits we often take action first 
and then compose thoughts (Weick, 1977). In other words, making sense retrospectively 
involves reflection on previous actions to more fully grasp the present. This retrospective 
quality of sensemaking is represented in Weick's maxim “how can I know what I think 
until I see what I say?” (1989, p. 247). Third, experiences are organized through a 
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process of enactment. Enactment involves taking a particular action, and that action 
organizes the available interpretations of that action and producing and organizing 
meaning. Fourth, sensemaking is embedded within social processes, thus communication 
is a central conduit for sharing information vis-a`-vis language, non-verbal messages, or 
textual artifacts. Fifth, sensemaking is an ongoing, circular process that involves stages of 
enactment, selection, and retention (Weick, 2001). This involves selecting the issue 
(enactment), formulating interpretations (selection), and then retaining certain 
interpretations (retention). Sixth, cues are extracted from the environment and these cues 
then become input for the sensemaking process. Thus, cues involve what is noticed in 
one's surroundings. Lastly, plausibility over accuracy details that humans are often 
satisfied with explanations that are reasonable and good enough, more than they are 
concerned with finding the most optimal and accurate explanation (Weick, 1995).  
 Sensemaking and negotiation. Sensemaking is a one suitable lens with which to 
examine gender differences in the propensity to negotiate, in part because both gender 
and negotiation have been described as sensemaking processes. Foremost, understanding 
one's gender has been framed as a life-long sensemaking process. Individuals 
continuously construct and reconstruct schemas of what it means to be a woman or man 
(Bem, 1981). Further, these schemas of gender are always in progress and can even be 
contradictory (Foldy, 2006; Tracy & Rivera, 2010). Additionally, the process of 
negotiating has also been described as a sensemaking process. Negotiations are 
notoriously rife with ambiguity. Negotiations are commonly void of clarity on the content 
of the exchange, that is; what is to be exchanged, who holds the “upper hand,” and the 
degree of investment the parties have in achieving and outcome (Bowles et al., 2005). In 
40 
addition, negotiators often have little guidance on exactly how they should behave or 
maneuver communicatively (Kray & Gelfand, 2009). Finally, negotiations are largely 
social and therefore involve parties that together co-construct a reality that is continually 
and dynamically unfolding (Putnam & Kolb, 2000).  
 The last property of sensemaking, plausibility over accuracy, is particularly 
germane to the propensity to negotiate. Plausibility over accuracy explicates that “to deal 
with ambiguity, interdependent people look for meaning, settle for plausibility, then 
move on” (Weick, 2005, p. 419). In other words, individuals often encounter situations 
that are ambiguous or do not make sense, and will then develop a plausible explanation to 
assuage this confusion or dissonance. The explanations are often developed without 
rigorous reasoning since humans are often satisfied with acceptable answers that quickly 
come to mind. Thus, sensemaking need not be perfect, because sensemaking is “not about 
truth and getting it right” (p. 415), instead sensemaking is developing a plausible story 
that is reasonable and socially accessible. The sensemaking principle of plausibility over 
accuracy also enlightens our understanding of gender effects in negotiation. For example, 
researchers have demonstrated the potential gains that can result from wage negotiations 
are vast (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991), yet many women opt for a conservative course of 
behavior or even purposeful inaction (Erikkson & Sanders, 2012; Small et al., 2007). The 
plausible, reasonable, and accessible course of action that women seem to be adopting is 
one of politeness (Brown & Levinson, 1987), largely consistent with traditional gender 
norms (Deaux & Major, 1987; Eagly, 1987, 1995).  
 To summarize, sensemaking entails resolving uncertainty or ambiguity with 
knowledge that is communicative and drawn from our social interactions. Therefore, 
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sensemaking fits quite well with the processes of negotiations, which inextricably tie the 
communicative process of meaning-making with deal-making (Putnam, 2010). As such, 
sensemaking serves as a useful theoretical lens with which to examine the propensity to 
negotiate. From this lens, one might evaluate how women and men make sense of 
negotiable situations and what interpretations are available to them during negotiation 
interactions based on their communicative and social experiences. To explore the rate of 
gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation in phase one, and to examine 
sensemaking in phase two, the following hypothesis and research questions are posed: 
H1: There will be significant gender differences in the propensity to negotiate. 
Specifically, men will be more likely to initiate a negotiation than will women.  
RQ1: How do participants make sense of their choices to initiate or avoid 
negotiations?  
Problematic Integration Theory 
The communication theory of PI relates to the tension between desires and 
expectations, or what Babrow (1992, 1995, 2001) refers to as probabilistic and evaluative 
orientations. The term 'probabilistic' refers to one's overall understanding of an object; 
this includes the characteristics of the object, how it came to be, and how it will behave. 
'Evaluative' refers to the relative value of the object, either positive or negative. For 
example, in wage negotiations, probabilistic orientations could be tied to the likelihood of 
attaining the payment, whether their counterpart is willing or able to provide the 
payment, and so forth. Evaluative orientations could be tied to the desirability of the 
payment, how it would affect the relationship, and so forth. Importantly, PI is guided by 
three main tenets: probabilistic and evaluative orientations are interconnected, can 
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become problematic, and are continuously developing through communication and lived 
experience.  
 The first main principle underlying the theory of PI (Bradac, 2001) is that 
probabilistic and evaluative orientations are interrelated and are integrated with little 
effort or conscious thought. For example, if one believes they have a low probability of 
receiving an annual holiday bonus, then the evaluation of that bonus might also be 
negative. On the other hand, if the probability of a holiday bonus is exceedingly high, 
then the evaluation of that event might be positive. In addition, evaluations can effect 
probabilities and probabilities can effect evaluations, either positively or negatively. If 
the likelihood of a raise becomes increasingly high, then an individual might view the 
value of the raise more positively. Conversely, if it becomes apparent that obtaining a 
raise is unlikely, then an individual might begin to devalue that raise and view it more 
negatively. Thus, probabilities and evaluations are interrelated, dynamic, and can shift in 
unison.  
 A second tenet of PI is that probabilities and evaluations are not always integrated 
seamlessly, but are potentially problematic. PI theory focuses on problematic situations in 
which our desires and expectations diverge. Specifically, the combination of probabilistic 
and evaluative orientations can take four 'problematic' forms: divergence (sadness when a 
positive outcome is not likely or sadness when a negative outcome is very likely), 
ambiguity (the odds of an event are unclear), ambivalence (multiple exclusive options are 
equally desirable or equally undesirable), and impossibility (a desirable outcome is not 
attainable). In other words, PI is useful for understanding “when expectations and desires 
diverge, when we are uncertain about something valuable, when we experience 
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ambivalence, and when we face impossible desires” (Matthias & Babrow, 2007, p. 788). 
It is under these problematic circumstances that people might opt to increase uncertainty, 
for problematic dilemmas have the potential to instigate negative feelings (Babrow, 
2001). Uncertainties are fundamentally unknowable and individuals need to evaluate 
whether they want to discover the unknowable (Babrow et al., 1998). For example, a 
negotiator might avoid inquiring about a wage promotion if they fear their boss has not 
been happy with their work performance. PI theory acknowledges that decision-making 
rationales are complex and individuals might not always seek to minimize uncertainty.  
 A final tenet of PI is that communication plays a central role. Communication 
with others is central to human life and the way we come to understand the world. As 
such, communication is the very material that constructs and demolishes probabilistic and 
evaluative orientations (Babrow, 2001; Matthias & Babrow, 2007). Therefore, 
communication is the central means through which PI is created, maintained, and 
transformed (Babrow, 1995, 2001, 2007).  
 The theory of PI, which details probabilities and evaluations, aligns well with the 
propensity to negotiate. Specifically, negotiations perceived to have a high probability of 
success are more likely to be pursued than negotiations with a low probability of success 
(Huppertz, 2003). That is, when individuals believe they can attain specific outcomes, 
they will be more likely to exert effort toward that end (Volkema, 2009; Volkema & 
Fleck, 2012), thus a high probabilistic orientation toward a negotiation is likely to be 
pursued. Next, evaluative concerns are focal motivators and demotivators for those 
deciding whether to negotiate. Negotiators maintain numerous evaluative concerns; they 
value or devalue any number of items at the negotiating table including monetary gains 
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and interpersonal relationships (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Halpern & McClean 
Parks, 1996). Negotiations are more likely to take place when the expected outcome is 
highly valued (Huppertz, 2003; Volkema, 2009). Therefore, while PI has yet to be 
considered in the context of negotiations, the tenets of PI are highly applicable to 
understanding negotiation interactions.  
 It has been proposed that the theory of PI has utility in a wide range of scenarios 
with an “almost unbounded domain of application” (Bradac, 2001, p. 466). PI is 
particularly useful in understanding the role of communication in producing and coping 
with feelings of uncertainty. Through the lens of PI, the decision to negotiate can be 
viewed as a process driven by probabilistic and evaluative understandings of negotiating, 
and the potential problematic integration of the two. Hence, this study aims to examine 
the role of gender in the formulation of probabilistic and evaluative judgments when 
deciding whether to negotiate.   
RQ2a: To what extent do women and men construct outcome probabilities for 
their negotiations? 
RQ2b: To what extent do women's and men's constructed outcome probabilities 
influence their propensity to negotiate?  
RQ2c: To what extent do women and men assign value to the outcome of the 
negotiation?  
RQ2d: To what extent do women's and men's assigned value influence their 
propensity to negotiate?  
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RQ2e: To what extent do participants indicate that the following problematic 
dilemmas are their reason they avoid negotiations: divergence, ambiguity, 
ambivalence, and impossibility. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Data were collected from participants in three ways: 1) laboratory observations, 2) 
semi-structured follow-up interviews, and 3) a quantitative survey. The laboratory study 
aimed to examine the rate of gender differences in the propensity to negotiate. The 
follow-up interviews were conducted immediately after the laboratory study and aimed to 
explore the reasons participants did or did not negotiate. These interviews were also used 
to explore the way individuals made sense of negotiating and indicated probabilistic and 
evaluative orientations. Lastly, a quantitative survey was administered that included 
demographic questions and the negotiation apprehension scale (Babcock et al., 2006). 
Taken together, these three data sources resulted in both qualitative and quantitative data 
which were used to investigate the proposed hypothesis and research questions.  
Participants 
 Participants were recruited from several undergraduate communication courses at 
a large public university in the southwestern United States. Participants were mainly 
recruited from lower division communication classes, to minimize the number of students 
who had taken an undergraduate course in conflict and negotiation offered through the 
university’s communication department. Two students had taken the conflict and 
negotiation course, which provides students with the opportunity to learn about 
recognizing negotiable opportunities, the process of initiating requests, and gender effects 
in the propensity to negotiate. The two participants who had taken the course did not 
attempt to initiate a negotiation.  
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The ‘task performance study’ was advertised to students as an opportunity to earn 
course extra credit and $3 to $10. Participant incentives were funded by the Conflict 
Transformation Project (CTP). Those who were interested in participating signed up for a 
time to come to the lab. Reminder e-mails were sent to participants one day prior to their 
appointment, which included detailed information such as the time, date, and location, 
along with a reminder that they would be earning between $3 and $10 and course extra 
credit.  
 All individuals from the laboratory study were invited to complete a follow-up 
interview. All participants agreed to complete the interview. While certainly there is a 
richness of information that comes with interviewing a small sample of participants, 
interviewing a large number of participants is useful for attaining a range of responses 
and for generating theory (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Thus, interviewing all participants 
was an appropriate strategy to gain a variety of perceptions and most comprehensively 
understand the phenomenon of interest: the propensity to negotiate.  
A total of 86 individuals (49 women and 37 men) participated in all phases of the 
study. The average age of participants was 20 years old (M = 19.98, mode = 19), and 
ranged from 18 to 36 years. Participants described themselves as White/Caucasian 
(45.8%), Asian (41%), Hispanic/Latin American (10.8%), and “Other” (1.2%). At the 
time of this study there were numerous extra credit opportunities circulating; however, 
many of these studies were not open to international students. Consequently, a hefty 
portion of the sample in this study consists of international students, though the exact 
number is unknown since the resident status of participants was not assessed via the 
quantitative or qualitative survey. The financial status of our participants was a relevant 
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consideration, given our interest in the participants’ propensity to ask for more money. 
The majority of participants were working part-time (32.1%), followed by looking for 
work (21%), not looking for work (17.3%), working full-time (14.8%), unable to work 
(8.6%), self-employed (3.7%), and retired (2.5%). Participants reported the annual 
income of their parents and the averages were moderately high. Many participants 
(42.2%) reported that their parent’s combined income was $80,000 while approximately 
half that number reported their parent income was below $79,999 (21.7%). Some 
participants did not know or did not report parental income (36.1%).  
Mixed Method Approach 
This mixed method study involves the 'mixing' of both quantitative and qualitative 
data (Creswell, 2002). The quantitative data proved to be useful for replicating past 
research and testing the prediction that there would be gender differences in the 
propensity to negotiate. The qualitative data elaborated on the quantitative data and 
allowed participants to explain the reasons for their behavior and share their personal 
perspectives on the topic of negotiation. These qualitative accounts provide researchers 
with information that is not directly observable (Tracy, 2013) and thus facilitated a more 
comprehensive understanding of negotiation engagement and avoidance.  
Concurrent Embedded Design 
Numerous mixed method designs exist, and most scholars agree that the 
appropriate design for a given study is dependent upon the proposed research questions 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Myers, 2014). 
Specifically, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) argue that the researcher should consider 
the quantitative and qualitative strands being collected, and then determine 1) the priority 
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of each strand, 2) the timing of the strands, and 3) the degree of interaction between the 
strands. Following these guidelines for design determination, an explanatory mixed 
method design (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011) was 
deemed most appropriate for answering the research questions in this study. Explanatory 
sequential designs begin with a first phase of quantitative data collection, subsequently 
followed by a second phase of qualitative data collection. The qualitative data from the 
second phase are used to explain findings from the first phase. Each of the decisions for 
determining design was carefully considered for the present study, and each merit 
discussion. First, priority in this study was given to the qualitative strand of the study. 
The qualitative phase addresses the main research question, 'why women and men don't 
negotiate' and will therefore be the heart of the study. Second, implementation of data 
strands was timed sequentially, meaning that the quantitative strand was collected first 
and then followed by the qualitative strand. The data from the second phase rely upon the 
data from the first strand (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2006); therefore, sequential timing was 
necessary. Lastly, integration of the two strands of data occurred during the results 
section.  
Advantages of Mixing Methods 
Mixed methods are an increasingly popular approach for conducting social 
science research, largely in an effort to overcome the perceived incommensurability of 
qualitative and quantitative research. Qualitative and quantitative are often dichotomized 
into separate philosophical paradigms, but increasingly scholars are recognizing that 
these two approaches need not be separated and can be particularly advantageous when 
used in tandem (Pearce, 2012). Instead of adhering to philosophical assumptions of 
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positivism or interpretivism, mixed methods projects often embrace a position of 
'pragmatism' (Creswell, 2009). Pragmatism does not commit to either induction or 
deduction, but instead embraces 'abduction' which involves moving back and forth 
between extant theory and the evidence in the data. Additionally, pragmatism does not 
maintain an axiological position of objectivity nor subjectivity, but embraces 
intersubjectivity and moving between these two poles (Hanson, 2008).  
 A mixed method approach is useful for replicating and then expanding current 
knowledge (Myers, 2014) and for obtaining “different but complementary data on the 
same topic” (Morse, 1991, p. 122). The quantitative phase of this study aligns with prior 
work (e.g., Babcock et al., 2006; Small et al., 2007), and then extends and elaborates on 
this prior work with follow-up qualitative interviews. This replication and extension of 
research is certainly a contribution to organizational scholarship for a few reasons. Not 
only does a mixed method perspective broaden knowledge for all those who study 
propensity, it also promotes the durability of social science research. Myers (2014) states 
that “Selecting mixed methods designs aids in probing issues and developing a complex 
view of organizational phenomena. For these reasons, mixed methods research can 
increase the value, usefulness, and visibility of organizational communication scholarship 
in organizational studies and the social sciences generally” (p. 315).  
Quantitative Data 
 The laboratory study was a replication of the work Small and her colleagues 
(2007) conducted to investigate “Who goes to the Negotiation Table.” The original study 
examined whether participants would initiate a negotiation when offered the minimum 
amount possible for completing an arbitrary task, a word game called Boggle. Results of 
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this study demonstrated that men were more likely than women to initiate a negotiation 
for more money. This finding has also been substantiated amongst a sample of college 
students in Sweden (Erikkson & Sanders, 2012).  
Procedures 
Participants were recruited to take part in a study in which they could earn 
between $3 and $10 and course extra credit. Students were informed about the study 
during their class time and were subsequently e-mailed the recruitment script and a link 
to sign up for a time slot to visit the lab. Participants were emailed reminder notices one 
to two days before their appointment. The e-mails detailed reiterated information in the 
recruitment script; the time, location, and that $3 to $10 could be earned for 
participation. After the first day of interviewing, it became clear that many of the 
participants were solely interested in extra credit. As such, starting the second day of the 
study, the $3 to $10 was increasingly emphasized to participants as soon as they entered 
the lab: a ‘$3 to $10’ sign was posted on the door of the lab, the informed consent had the 
pay range highlighted in yellow, and the lab assistants reiterated payment to participants 
in their initial interaction. 
Upon arrival, participants were seated in a private cubicle where they were 
instructed how to complete the “Boggle” word game. The confederates then read the 
Boggle instructions to the participant and then provided them with a typed copy they 
could use as a reference. Game instructions asked participants to “Shake the game cube, 
then stop, allowing the lettered dice to fall into the grid at the bottom of the cube. Once 
the letters fall into the grid, you should search through the lettered grid and identify as 
many words as possible. Words can be formed from letters that are adjoined horizontally, 
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vertically, or diagonally to the left, right, upwards, or downwards. No letter can be used 
more than once within the same word.” Each of the four rounds of Boggle were played 
identically, and each round lasted a total of three minutes. The instructions also informed 
participants, “Once you have completed the four rounds, please indicate to the 
experimenter that you are finished so that she or he can score your rounds. Then you will 
be paid and proceed to the final phase of the study.”  
Confederates guided participants through each of the rounds and largely 
controlled the timer that was used to monitor the time as it elapsed through the rounds. 
After the participant indicated they had completed the game, the confederate took the 
scorecard and asked the participant to wait while the score was calculated. The 
confederate exited the room and entered an adjacent room where they calculated the 
Boggle score. After the Boggle score was calculated, approximately three minutes, the 
experimenter returned to the participant. From here, the experimenters did not provide 
participants with feedback, but simply provided the participant with $3 in cash and asked 
“Here is $3, is that OK?” All participants were given the minimum $3 and were only 
given up to $10 if they 'asked for it', or attempted to negotiate. The participants who 
negotiated or asked for more money were coded as a 'negotiate.’ The participants who did 
not initiate a negotiation were coded as a 'no negotiation.' If the participant complained 
about the payment, then the participant was coded as a ‘complaint’, but was only given 
more money if the complaint included a request for more money. That is, complaints that 
naturally escalated to a request for money were consummated. Participants that asked for 
further explanation of pay determination were told that a full report would be made 
53 
available to them once the study was complete. These individuals who ‘asked for an 
explanation of pay determination’ were coded as such.   
 Participants were not given any external cue informing them how well they 
performed. For one, the arrangement of Boggle letters is completely random. In addition, 
there is no feedback or gauge of performance. The isolated nature of this task is absent 
from social comparison data of performance which fundamental to the conventional 
“Boggle” game. In other words, participants would not have a social reference with 
which to gauge their performance.  
Confederates. Four confederates were used for this study: two females and two 
males. These confederates were responsible for leading participants into the lab, 
providing participants with instructions, paying participants, and taking observational 
notes throughout the process. Each of the confederates was provided with standardized 
scripts for how to interact with and respond to the participants, including how to respond 
to requests for more money. Further, the study used a double-blind approach, meaning 
that neither the confederates nor the participants were aware of the objective of this 
study. Throughout the study, I met with the confederates and asked them what they had 
been observing. To my surprise, the confederates rarely mentioned explicit gender effects 
within the study. The confederates often hypothesized that those with a high language 
and vocabulary skills would be more likely to negotiate; similar comments about the 
influence of language skills were noted many times throughout their observational notes.   
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Measures 
 Gender. Gender of the participant was observed at the time of the interview, and 
recorded in the field note data. Females were coded with an arbitrary numerical value of 
'1' and males were coded with the arbitrary number '2’. 
 Behavioral choice. In the laboratory study, the outcome measure was the 
behavioral choice made by the participant; negotiating versus not negotiating. 
Participants that initiated a negotiation were coded with a '1' and those who did not 
negotiate were coded with a ‘2’. It was also noted when participants behaved in ways that 
varied from the simple ask-no ask dichotomy. Participants who complained upon 
payment were coded as a ‘3’ and those who asked how payment was calculated were 
coded as a ‘4’.  
 Boggle performance. Following the Boggle game, the researcher scored the 
performance using the Boggle scoring rubric. The rubric details that one point is awarded 
for three-letter words, two points for four-letter words, three points for five-letter words, 
four points for six-letter words, five points for seven-letter words, and six points for 
words with eight or more letters. See table 1 for the Boggle scoring key. The actual task 
score was used for the descriptive analyses. Task performance scores were used to 
examine whether there were gender differences in actual task performance. 
Table 1 
Scoring Key for Boggle Performance Task  
Number of Letters 3 4 5 6 7 8 or more 
Points 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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 Negotiation apprehension. The apprehension scale is a subscale from the 
Propensity to Initiate Negotiation (PIN) scale (Babcock et al., 2006). Sample items 
include “I feel anxious when I have to ask for something I want,” and “It always feels so 
unpleasant to have to ask for things myself.” Negotiation apprehension has been 
demonstrated to correlate with the propensity to negotiate (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011), 
and research demonstrates that women experience this apprehension more frequently than 
do men (Babcock et al., 2006). Given that negotiation apprehension is a valuable 
predictor of the propensity to negotiate, this scale was included to evaluate how 
apprehension relates to the propensity to negotiate. The alpha coefficient for the 
apprehension scale was high (α = .92). See Appendix B for the Negotiation Apprehension 
scale.  
Qualitative Data 
Data Collection 
The qualitative portion of this study was principally comprised of data from semi-
structured interviews. The interviews were conducted directly after the quantitative phase 
and included all of the 86 participants from the laboratory study. The interviews lasted an 
average of 10 minutes in length and ranged from four minutes to 35 minutes. Interview 
questions explored reasons for initiating a negotiation or failing to do so, how individuals 
make sense of negotiation, and probabilistic and evaluative orientations related to 
negotiating. These interviews served as an extension of the Small et al. (2007) study that 
relied solely on experimental manipulation and quantitative data to explore the reasons 
individuals chose to engage and avoid negotiations. Thus, the interviews provided a novel 
methodological extension of the present literature because participants had not yet had 
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the opportunity to share their personal and unique experience in the context of this 
experiment. All participants were asked for their consent to have the interview audio-
recorded. The interview protocol was developed from a review of the relevant gender and 
negotiation literature. There were slight wording changes to the interview protocol 
throughout the study; however, the majority of the questions remained the same. See 
Appendix C for the interview protocol. 
Data Analysis 
First, each interview was transcribed verbatim. Second, the entire set of 
interviews, confederate notes, and field notes, were read closely. The goal was to become 
familiarized with the data. Next, a primary cycle of coding was conducted by crafting and 
assigning words or brief phrases to the concepts being described in the transcripts. This 
primary cycle of coding was less devoted to interpretation and analysis, but instead was 
aimed at simplifying complex thoughts and actions into simple words or phrases. It was 
at this time that a codebook was created and then maintained to organize themes with 
their corresponding codes and definitions (Tracy, 2013).   
 Data were analyzed using content analysis. After the first level of coding, there 
was an additional level of coding to specifically identify concepts related to problematic 
integration and sensemaking processes. First, the data were coded to identify specific 
sensemaking processes such as uncertainty and retrospection. Instances of uncertainty 
were also noted, given that sensemaking and PI rest upon the premise of uncertainty in 
the scene. Themes were reviewed and defined, and then renamed when necessary (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006). Additionally, axial coding (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) was conducted to 
identify connections between categories.  
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  Next, the interview data were coded to identify processes of PI in the decision to 
negotiate. Specifically, the data were coded to identify all probabilistic (i.e., positive, 
negative, uncertain, etc.) and evaluative (i.e., positive, negative, indifferent, etc.) 
statements made by participants. Positive probabilities included statements such as “I was 
expecting $10,” and “just assumed I was gonna get more.” Negative probabilities 
included statements such as “low chances” and “slim chance.” Positive evaluations about 
the money included statements such as “I’m happy with $3” and “everyone needs more 
money.” Negative evaluations included statements such as “kinda upset” and “wish I had 
more.” Several of the interviews included multiple probabilistic and evaluative 
orientations. While every reference to probability or value was coded, each orientation 
was only counted once per participant. For example, one participant made three separate 
positive evaluations about $10. While each of the positive evaluations was coded, only 
one was included in the total number of positive evaluations made by the participants. 
This way, an interview with multiple positive evaluations, such as excitement about 
money, would not weigh more heavily in the overall analysis. To conclude, problematic 
integrations (divergence, ambiguity, ambivalence, impossibility) were examined by 
comparing each participants probabilistic orientation to their evaluative orientation.  
 Chi-square tests were used to determine whether there were gender differences for 
each of the qualitative categories. For this study, our interest was in whether women and 
men equally explained why they did not negotiate, formed probabilities, and formed 
evaluations. Chi-square tests aid the researcher in determining whether proportions are 
statistically significant between comparative groups, as opposed to relying simply on 
personal judgment. That said, while statistical significance is important to examine, the 
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trends and practical significance in the data have also been examined (Barnes & Conley, 
1986).  
Data Reliability and Credibility 
To ensure the credibility of the data, colleagues and advisors were consulted 
throughout the data collection process to discuss emergent findings. This “peer 
debriefing” or external audit process has been deemed an effective strategy for increasing 
the credibility and validity of qualitative research (Creswell, 2009), and this was certainly 
true for the present study. Peer guidance was sought on a number of procedural issues 
including gaining participant trust and increasing participant awareness of the financial 
incentive. Lastly, I also had a colleague sporadically monitor the lab for quality 
assurance.  
Additionally, a journal was maintained throughout all phases of the research 
process. This journal was used to document all the steps in the research process. Taylor 
and Bogdan (1998) describe that taking notes is a useful approach for “emerging themes, 
interpretations, hunches, and striking gestures” (p. 115). Indeed, journaling proved to be a 
useful tool for recording observations and reflections for multiple reasons. First, 
journaling proved useful for identifying early trends. For example, early in this study it 
was observed that participants were unaware and apathetic to the money; therefore efforts 
were made to increase the salience of the monetary payment. While increasing the 
salience of money could have bolstered the rate of negotiating, there is little evidence to 
support that these efforts had a significant effect since participants negotiated at a similar 
rate before and after the manipulation. Journaling also provided a record of events that 
facilitated the data analysis process.  
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To determine intercoder reliability, two undergraduate students were trained on 
the coding schemes and independently analyzed 25% of the data. To calculate reliability, 
the number of coded texts in agreement were divided the total number of codes. This 
method is a common method for determining reliability of qualitative data (Campbell, 
Quincy, Osserman, & Pedersen, 2013; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Tracy, Myers, & Scott, 
2006). For example, the first coder analyzed 73 texts and there was agreement on 66 of 
those texts. Thus, the resulting intercoder reliability for the first coder was 90% (66/73 = 
.90). The second coder analyzed the same 73 texts and there was agreement on 64 of 
those texts, resulting in an intercoder reliability of 87% (64/73 = .87). The overall 
average was calculated and was determined to be 89% (130/146) which met the 
predetermined reliability goal of 80% (Hodson, 1999; Miles & Huberman, 1994). I 
worked with the coders to discuss the categorization of codes, and none of the categories 
or codes was in need of modification.  
My Role as a Researcher  
Gender is “complex, multifarious, and changing” (Lengel & Martin, 2002, p. 
337). In a highly globalized, postmodern world, it is nearly impossible to obtain a simple 
understanding of gender. As a woman, I find myself continuously discovering what it 
means to be a woman, and I am often intrigued by the various conceptualizations that 
other women have constructed for themselves. Therefore, I approach gender as a type of 
culture in which the shades of femininity and masculinity are contextually situated. As 
such, I support the argument that the values and ideals surrounding gender need to be 
professed with sensitivity to a broad range of cultures (Hedge, 2006). Sensitivity is also 
needed in with regard to gender and negotiation. The research devoted to gender and 
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negotiation has yet to fully understand the degree to which social consequences occur. 
Consequently, blanket statements of what women should and should not do in a 
negotiation are problematic. Indeed, research has yet to demonstrate that women should 
persistently and intensely negotiate. That said, feminist scholarship in the pursuit of 
justice and democracy is essential to the accomplishment of pay equity for women and 
men (Lengel & Martin, 2002). It is important for both women and men to have a full 
understanding of the reasons they are negotiating and the consequences of their chosen 
strategy. In sum, goal is for women and men to achieve self-awareness rather than a 
personal transformation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS  
This chapter presents the results of data analyzed using observations, surveys, and 
interviews. These data sources then resulted in qualitative and quantitative data. The 
quantitative data was used to examine preliminary questions regarding the Boggle 
performance scores and the self-reported apprehension level of the participants in this 
study. The quantitative data was also used to examine the first hypothesis related to 
gender differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. The qualitative interviews 
were used to examine the remainder of the research questions. Content analysis was used 
to examine the extent to which sensemaking and PI theory were indicated as influential in 
the decision to initiate a negotiation. Intercoder reliability is also established in this 
chapter.  
Quantitative Results 
 Quantitative analyses were used to determine if there were gender differences in 
Boggle game performance, negotiation apprehension, and the rate of initiating a 
negotiation. The first quantitative analysis was used to examine gender differences in 
actual Boggle performance using an independent samples t-test. In addition, ethnic 
differences in Boggle performance were examined using ANOVA (analysis of variance). 
Next, gender differences in negotiation apprehension were examined using an 
independent sample t-test. Lastly, gender differences in the rate of initiating a negotiation 
were examined using a Fisher’s exact test. Prior to the quantitative data analysis the data 
were screened for missing and out-of-range values, and none were revealed. All 
quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS (Statistical Package of the Social Sciences).  
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Boggle Performance Scores 
Boggle scores were calculated by following the traditional Boggle scoring rubric, 
which was also the rubric used by Small et al. (2007). One point was awarded for three-
letter words, two points for four-letter words, three points for five-letter words, four 
points for six-letter words, five points for seven-letter words, and six points for words 
with eight or more letters. An independent sample t-test was conducted to examine 
whether gender differences existed in Boggle performance. Results indicated no 
significant differences between women and men in round one [t(84) = 1.39, p = .46], 
round two (t(84) = 1.27, p = .24), round three [t(84) = 1.03, p = .84], or the total score 
[t(84)= 1.3, p = .42]. However, significant gender differences were found in round four 
Boggle scores with women scoring significantly higher (M = 33.08, SD= 23.92) than men 
(M = 28.89, SD = 16.67), t(84) = .91, p = .01.   
Throughout the interviews, numerous Asian participants suggested their language 
barrier contributed to their poor performance in the Boggle game. Consequently, an 
ANOVA was conducted to examine whether there were ethnic differences in Boggle 
performance. Indeed, total score for the Boggle game was significantly predicted by the 
ethnicity of the participant [F(2, 81) = 15.48, p < .001]. Tukey post hoc tests demonstrate 
that Asians scored significantly lower than both Caucasians (p < .001) and Hispanics (p = 
.02). There were no significant differences between Caucasians and Hispanics in Boggle 
scores (p = .89).   
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Negotiation Apprehension 
 To gauge negotiation apprehension level, participants completed the Negotiation 
Apprehension scale (Babcock et al., 2006). Results of an independent sample t-test 
suggest that women experience greater negotiation apprehension (M = 4.16, SD = 1.27) 
than men (M = 3.67, SD = 1.72), t(84)=1.48, p = .02. Results of a one-way ANOVA 
suggest no ethnic differences in negotiation apprehension (F(2, 80) = 2.44, p = .09). 
Specifically, negotiation apprehension scores were similar for Caucasians (M = 3.61, SD 
= 1.57), Asians (M = 4.14, SD = 1.18), and Hispanics (M = 4.69, SD = 1.98).  
Gender and the Propensity to Negotiate 
Hypothesis 1 predicted there would be significant gender differences in the 
propensity to initiate a negotiation, with men more likely to initiate negotiations than 
women. Only four of the 86 participants initiated a negotiation for higher pay, which is 
roughly 4.6 percent of the total sample. Of the four participants who negotiated, there 
were an equal number of women (n=2) and men (n=2). To put it another way, 4.1% of 
women and 5.4% of men initiated a negotiation. To determine whether these rates of 
negotiating were significantly different between women and men, a Fisher’s exact test 
was conducted. Fisher’s exact tests are used to determine if there are significant 
differences in one dichotomous variable as a function of another dichotomous variable. 
Fisher’s exact tests are particularly appropriate for testing equality of proportions when 
the sample sizes are small (Agresti, 1990). In the present study, the Fisher’s exact test 
was be used to examine if there are gender differences (female, male) in the propensity to 
initiate a negotiation (negotiate, no negotiation).  
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Results of the Fisher’s exact test were non-significant and suggest no gender 
differences in the rate of initiating a negotiation, [Fisher’s (1, 86) = .08, p = .58]. In other 
words, there are no significant differences between women and men in the rate of 
initiating a negotiation (ask, no ask). During data collection it was also recorded which 
participants complained about the $3 amount they paid and also those who asked how 
their score was calculated. Thus, an additional Fisher’s exact test was conducted to 
determine whether there were gender differences in to examine whether there were 
gender differences in the four asking conditions: ask, don’t ask, complain, and asked how 
score was calculated. Again, results suggest there were no gender differences in the rate 
of initiating a negotiation using the four categories [Fisher’s (3, 86) = 2.32, p = .57]. 
Taken together, H1 was not supported by the quantitative data.  
Qualitative Results 
Research question 1 aimed to qualitatively examine whether there were gender 
differences in the explanations for initiating or avoiding a negotiation. Specifically, by 
examining qualitative data, with the use of PI theory and sensemaking, a more nuanced 
and comprehensive understanding of gender and the propensity to negotiate can be 
examined. 
The first objective was to examine the underlying reasons individuals did and did 
not initiate a negotiation. Interestingly, most participants offered multiple explanations 
for why they chose to negotiate or not negotiate. It seems likely that the interview 
allowed participants to reflect and make sense of their behavior, causing their 
explanations to expand or shift. For example, throughout one interview, a participant 
offered multiple reasons he did not negotiate for more money. The participant explained 
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that at first he did not think to ask, but then went on to say he was confused and did not 
understand what the money was for, would have felt greedy, didn’t deserve $3 because he 
didn’t do very much, could have been offensive, rude, and possibly “taken [the 
researcher] back.” Therefore, participant explanations for their behavior were often fluid 
and copious.  
Reasons FOR Negotiating 
Four participants initiated a negotiation for more money and each was paid the 
exact amount they requested. Specifically, participants requested and were paid $5, $7, 
$10, and $10. The explanations offered by the four participants who chose to initiate a 
negotiation are valuable in that they provide insight into the motivations that stimulate 
negotiating. If one adopts the perspective that negotiating is laudatory, then these 
individual ‘success stories’ can serve as examples of behavior that can be replicated. 
Table 2 lists the verbal requests each participant made for more money. This table was 
compiled using audio recordings of the requests, confederate notes, and reflections the 
participant provided in the interview.  
One common reason individuals initiated a negotiation is that they felt they 
deserved more money. Some participants believed they deserved more because they 
worked hard or exerted a large amount of effort. One participant was visibly irritated 
when he arrived to the study, and he complained that the time slots available for the 
research study were inconvenient and forced him to wait around campus for a significant 
amount of time. The participant said that this inconvenience is what motivated him to ask 
for more money. The participant claimed, “I paid a lot to participate in this study, and I 
think I deserve $5.” Thus, this participant determined that he deserved more money 
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because the effort he exerted was worth more than the baseline $3. Another reason 
individuals felt they deserved more is that they performed well on the Boggle game. One 
female asked for $7 because her longest word, hairnet, was a seven-letter word. This 
participant proclaimed herself a “Good Boggler” and said, “You told us that words must 
be a minimum of three letters long, and $3 was the minimum payment amount. So I 
figured since I made a seven-letter word then I deserved seven dollars.” In the absence of 
a payment protocol this participant constructed her own payment guide and determined 
that she deserved $7, not the $3 she was given.  
 Another reason participants initiated a negotiation, particularly both female 
negotiators, is that they had learned to negotiate. These two female participants said that 
they learned that negotiating is not only acceptable but also lucrative. These life lessons 
about the importance of negotiating came to them through either through parental 
modeling or work experiences. The first female negotiator related that she commonly 
negotiates and had learned from her Polish mother that negotiating is a fundamental part 
of life.  
“My mom is from Poland and so that's what they do, they haggle. Oh my gosh, 
I've learned so much from her. When we go shopping she'll say, ‘Oh there's a little thread 
missing, can I just get a little 10% discount or something.’ She always did that, so when I 
was little I just watched her. So you just have to ask.” While this participant had been 
taught to negotiate early in life, the second female negotiator had only recently learned 
the importance of negotiating. Specifically, the second female negotiator learned through 
her professional experiences that negotiating is a valuable endeavor. When asked if she 
always negotiates for things in life, she expounded on a lesson she learned at work:  
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No, just recently [I’ve started negotiating]. Because my job told me to start 
keeping metrics of what I do, and how I ... like... I plan trips for researchers, and 
so, they want me to like, that way if I ever go to another job, this is exactly how 
many trips I've planned, the is the dollar amount, this is what I've done so this is 
what my pay should be.  
These experiences recounted by the female negotiators demonstrate that they were taught 
or encouraged to pursue negotiating endeavors. Interestingly, neither of the two male 
participants referenced memorable life lessons as influential in their choice to initiate a 
negotiation. While the sample of negotiators is too small to confidently declare gender 
differences exist, the finding that female negotiators had been taught or encouraged to 
negotiate is worth noting.  
Finally, one participant decided to initiate a negotiation because he had higher 
expectations. The male negotiator expected to get $10 because he thought everyone 
received $10 for participation. Clearly this negotiator misinterpreted the pay allocation in 
the study; however, this misunderstanding proved to be advantageous. As a result, this 
participant was visibly surprised when he received $3. When given the $3, he asked, 
“Isn’t it $10? Can I get $7 in the next phase?” Thus, the participant’s expectations of $10 
caused a negative reaction when $3 was awarded, and this discomfort resulted in the 
initiation of a negotiation.  
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Table 2 
Verbal Requests Made by Participants Who Initiated Negotiations 
Amount  Gender Race Response 
$5 M Asian “Only $3? The sheet said $3 to $10, and I waited a long time, so maybe I could get $5?” 
$10 M White "Isn't it $10? Can I get $7 in the next phase?"  
$10 F White “What about $10? I’ll take $10 if I can get it.” 
$7 F White "I wrote a 7-letter word, shouldn't I get $7?" 
 
Reasons for NOT Negotiating 
One of the first questions asked of participants is whether they considered asking 
for more money. The majority of participants indicated they did not think to ask for more 
than the $3, and thus clearly did not recognize the opportunity to negotiate. A few 
participants offered this as the main reason they did not initiate a negotiation. While most 
participants did not recognize the opportunity, many suggested one or more additional 
reasons as to why they did not initiate a negotiation.  
The reasons participants indicated they did not negotiate include: they mainly 
came for the extra credit, did not earn the money, performed poorly, did not care about 
the money, the margin between $3 to $10 is narrow, they were volunteering, one should 
take what you’re given, negotiating would be rude/inappropriate, and lastly negotiating 
would be unlike them/out of character. Each of these reasons will be described next.  
Not on the radar. One common reason participants did not initiate a negotiation 
was that they came to the study for extra credit, not for money (32.2%). In fact, many 
further rationalized that the money was not their main purpose or primary goal (16.3%). 
For example, one participant described, “I just wanted extra credit, money wasn’t the 
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primary reason I came.” The narrow objective of pursuing extra credit seemed to 
constrict the possibilities to participants, causing most people to disregard the monetary 
payment.  
In fact, some participants said they were surprised when they received the money 
and explained they had not thought about the money until it was handed to them. For 
example one participant stated, “I wasn’t even aware that I was even getting money in the 
first place.” Another participant described feeling stunned when given the money: “I 
didn’t know if I should take it or not. I just looked at the table and wondered if I should 
take it.” Early in the study we recognized this recurring trend that participants were 
surprised that there was money being given for participation. To address this issue, 
numerous measures were taken to remind participants about the payment. First, reminder 
e-mails for the study included large bolded words that read “Earn $3-$10 AND extra 
credit.” Secondly, a large sign was placed outside of the research room that read, “Earn 
$3 to $10.” Lastly, once participants entered the lab they were reminded that they would 
be paid after their Boggle scores were calculated. Despite the reminders of payment 
throughout the various stages of the study, some participants were still surprised by the 
money, which likely hampered their ability to construct probabilistic or evaluative 
orientations.   
One participant described being surprised that he was handed payment in the form 
of dollar bills. “I feel like it was like, loose change. It was kinda informal. I thought it 
would be like, you know, you’d send it off to my student account or something.” This 
account highlights that paper money has become somewhat obsolete, is less frequently 
exchanged, and thus lends to an awkward interpersonal exchange.   
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Did not earn the money. A hefty portion of participants (17.4%) claimed that 
they did not earn the money. Many said that they did not do much or did not exert much 
effort. One participant stated, “I don’t feel I’m giving up much that’s worth more than 
$3.” In fact, eight participants described the joy they experienced while playing the game. 
One participant went so far as to express thanks for allowing him to participate in the 
study, saying that he really appreciated the time to de-stress from the exams he had that 
week. Another claimed “the goal of the game is to make myself happy.” Some expressed 
guilt for receiving money; people felt bad for taking money that they did not perceive 
was rightly theirs. A few participants tried to return the money, both males and females. 
One participant described, “I felt guilty, I was just going to leave it on the table.” 
Participants also did not initiate a negotiation because they perceived they 
performed poorly (6%). One participant said he did not negotiate “because I know I was 
doing bad, so…. $3 is the most I can get, I guess.” A subset of these self-proclaimed 
‘poor performers’ included Asian students who perceived that their subpar English skills 
hindered their performance, which ultimately kept them from asking for more money. 
One Asian male was asked if he thought about asking for more money and replied “No, 
because I know like…my... language barrier. And I know a lot of words that I wrote is 
like… really simple and some like childish words.” Thus, for many, the act of initiating a 
negotiation seemed unreasonable without a defensible justification for their request.  
Indifferent to the money. Another reason individuals did not initiate a 
negotiation is a proclaimed indifference to the money (16.3%). In particular, 
participants either described that they did not care about the money or did not need the 
money. A conversation with one participant revealed his immense indifference to money:  
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Casey: How did you feel about the $3 that you did receive?  
Male:  What do you mean?  
Casey: Well he gave you money, right? Or did he run away with your money? 
Male:  I don't feel how much money that I get... yeah... I don't care about how 
much money that I get. I just care about the extra credit.  
Casey: Would you be sad if we took the money back?  
Male: No, I can give it back 
Casey: No, no, no! We don't want the money, it's for you; we want you to keep it.  
Male: I don't care about how much money I get.  
Casey: How would you feel if you got $10?  
Male: If you give me $10, I will donate for the homeless people.  
Casey: Really? You just don't care about money.  
Male: I don't care about money.  
Another common claim by participants was that the difference between $3 and 
$10 was a narrow margin (5.8%), one that isn’t worth the effort. One participant 
described, “It doesn’t really matter. It’s just $7, so it wouldn’t make or break me.” 
Another participant reiterated the small margin when he said, “It isn’t that much money; 
I’m not gonna make a big deal about it.” A few participants considered the dollar amount 
that would provoke them to negotiate. For example, one participant explained, “If it was 
like five dollars versus a hundred dollars I probably would have been like okay, why 
didn’t I get more than that?” It seems that many of the participants perceived $7 as a 
meager amount that was enough to prompt them to initiate a negotiation.  
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 Take what you’re given. Another main reason participants did not initiate a 
negotiation is that they perceived they were helping research (24.4%). Many understood 
research participation to be a type of volunteer activity and “helping out” research is 
something they should do without payment. Research participation was almost described 
as a type of charity work. Participants explained that research studies rarely, if ever, offer 
any type of remuneration. “I’ve never been in a study for money.” As such, being given 
money in this study struck participants as an unusual practice. A few people expressed 
concern over the source of funding and said they felt bad about taking money from a 
graduate student. For example, one participant described, “I would feel like I’m kind of 
taking from I don’t know, college students, almost. You know? Like you don’t know 
who’s funding it.” Taken together, participants perceived that in the setting of a research 
study it would not be appropriate or necessary to ask for more money.  
Along these lines, another common reason for not negotiating is that individuals 
expressed the belief that when given money you should simply obey the process and 
take what you’re given (14%). For example, one participant described “what you… what 
you give me I will accept.” A few participants relayed a sense of trust in how the 
payment and score were calculated. In a sense, participants bestowed a great deal of trust 
in the system and payment procedures. One participant claimed, “I figured you had a 
scoring system.” Participants described that they trusted how the researchers calculated 
and distributed money. “It stated the amount would be given between $3 and $10, and I 
feel like well, you’ve earned this amount or you’re selected to have this amount.” 
Many participants alluded to a type of obedience to authority as a reason for not 
negotiating, commonly alluding to the confederates and the researcher in a way that 
73 
implied power. “[The confederate] said my score would come in a report; I guess I won’t 
have questions after that.” The participants were not the only ones to recognize power as 
a factor in this study. On the first day of the study, I took note of how one female 
confederate maintained a commanding presence and appeared comfortable in a position 
of power. On the second day, I noticed the male confederate was also embodying a 
“commanding presence.” This same male confederate noted that the participants were 
simply accepting what was given to them, reiterating the prominence of obedience to 
authority. About midway through the study, I asked one of the male confederates how he 
was enjoying his role as a confederate. The male confederate responded that his role in 
this study made him feel as though he were important, and he was enjoying being in a 
position of power over classmates that were similar to his age. One of the female 
confederates concurred and said she too enjoyed the power and respect she was getting 
from people in her own age group. Clearly, the participants perceived themselves as 
powerless, and the confederates perceived themselves as powerful. For some, this 
lopsided division of power kept them from negotiating for more money.  
Maintaining face. A final reason participants did not initiate a negotiation is they 
believed it would be rude or inappropriate (10.5%). Negotiating for more money would 
either disrespect the person they would be asking or would make themselves feel 
embarrassed. Participants said “It’s just not respectful” and “Money is one of those things 
where I feel like it can be a social boundary that you don’t really want to cross.” A few 
participants (4.7%) claimed that negotiating would be out of character, and negotiating 
or asking for things is not like them. In other words, initiating a negotiation could result 
in a loss of face or threaten the face of others.   
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Gender differences in reasons for not negotiating. Gender differences in the 
reasons for not initiating a negotiation were examined using chi-square analyses and 
frequency counts. A series of chi-square analyses were conducted to determine if there 
were statistically significant gender differences in the reasons participants did not initiate 
a negotiation. Results suggest there were statistically significant differences between the 
proportion of women and men who perceived that negotiating would be rude or 
inappropriate. Specifically, 16.3% of women indicated negotiating would be rude or 
inappropriate in comparison to 2.7% of men [χ² (85) = 2.0, p = .04].  
 Frequency counts of the data reveal a few notable patterns of variance between 
women and men in the reasons for not initiating a negotiation. First, men more frequently 
devalued the money in comparison to women. A large portion of men (24.3%) indicated 
they did not care about the money while fewer women (10.2%) provided the same reason. 
In addition, 10.8% of men indicated that $3 to $10 was a narrow margin while only 2% 
of women implicated the small margin as a reason they did not initiate a negotiation. 
Women, however, more frequently indicated that they did not initiate a negotiation 
because it would be rude or inappropriate. Specifically, nine females (16.3%) and only 
one male (2.7%) indicated they were concerned that negotiating would be rude or 
inappropriate. See figure 1 for a bar chart listing the reasons women and men did not 
initiate a negotiation.  
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Figure 1. Bar chart of the reasons women and men did not initiate a negotiation.  
Sensemaking 
Sensemaking was pervasive in this study. This research study was rife with 
uncertainty, triggered instances of information seeking, and encouraged participant 
sensemaking through retrospection and intersubjective understanding.  
Uncertainty. Participants noted numerous indications of uncertainty throughout 
the study. One of the confederates astutely described the uncertainty in the study: “People 
are usually nervous dealing with uncertainty; people they don't know, unfamiliar rooms, 
and unfamiliar situations. My role is to facilitate a more comfortable experience.” While 
the confederate was blind to the study, she observed that participants were provided with 
little information.  
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Participants also acknowledged the uncertainty in this study. Specifically, 
participants described there was uncertainty with regard to a) their personal Boggle 
performance b) others’ performance/earnings, c) how the score/payment was determined, 
d) the purpose of the money, and e) the overall premise of the study. In fact, most 
participants described uncertainty in more than one of these areas. For example, one 
participant describes uncertainty with regards to both the premise of the study and the 
determination of payment:  
I was trying to figure out what the study was about the whole time. I was thinking, 
“maybe they’re looking for who negotiates or, who um... just goes with it”…I was 
wondering like, how are they, uh, doing the score because usually when you play 
Boggle you play against somebody and you start, like, start crossing each others’ 
words out. So yeah, I was like “How is she gonna do the score?’ And then, how 
do you they pay you off that score?”  
Information seeking. By and large, there were few attempts by the participants to 
seek information throughout this study. Throughout my field notes, there were many 
instances in which I was astonished at how little individuals questioned the process. For 
example, I noted, “None of the participants seemed curious about the large cameras in the 
room or the double-sided mirror. I thought they would have asked more questions.”  
Two participants sought information before coming to the study. Both individuals 
knew people who had already completed the study and had asked their friends what the 
study entailed. One participant was denied additional information from their friend and 
was informed that it was a “secret study.” The second participant asked a friend about the 
study, and she told him that she knew how he could get the $10. He retorted that he did 
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not want to know and bragged that he would be able to get the $10 without her help. He 
was confident he could figure out the study on his own. Despite his confidence, this 
participant did not figure out how to get $10, and received $3 just as his friend did.   
None of the participants sought additional information before or during the 
Boggle game regarding the task or payment. One female participant did, however, 
question the amount of extra credit she would be given. This participant noticed the 
informed consent form listed five points of extra credit would be awarded while she 
understood she would be getting six points of extra credit. She strongly asserted that it 
was important for her to get six points and it was these terms that she felt were fair. Upon 
payment, a few participants sought additional information including “why did I get $3?” 
and “how was the payment determined.” To be specific, nine participants asked how the 
payment was determined, four females and five males. In response, confederates had 
been instructed to say “Is $3 not okay?” Participants then acquiesced and expressed 
complacency with the $3 payment.  
More commonly, participants sought information during the interview. These 
additional inquiries were related to a variety of topics regarding the study. Some 
participants asked what the premise of the study was: “what were you studying?” “Will 
you tell me soon”? and “When will I get my score?” A series of inquiries followed the 
revelation of the premise of the study. Once participants discovered that the study was 
exploring the likelihood of negotiating for more money, many asked questions such as 
“Did anybody ask for more [money]? …And did they get it?” A few participants went on 
to ask “can I get the money now?” 
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The isolated nature of the Boggle game contributed to a situation in which 
participants had difficulty making sense. While sensemaking can take place in isolation, 
sensemaking is often a collective, social process, and we don’t know what we know until 
it is discussed collectively (Weick, 1995). In the relatively isolated environment of the 
study, many participants expressed the difficulty of making sense of the situation without 
other people to make sense with. “It was hard to know how I did, comparatively.” Many 
participants described that without referent others, it was difficult to make sense of the 
situation. For example: “I wish I could compare mine to how other people have done;” 
and “I don’t know how you guys are scoring it either, but I dunno.” Participants were 
asked what would have made them negotiate or ask for more money in this situation. A 
large portion of people said that they would have negotiated for more had they known 
how other people performed or knew what others were being paid. While sensemaking 
did not take place before or during the study, participants did begin to make sense during 
the follow-up interview.  
Extracting cues. A few participants were able to pull cues from the environment 
and attempted to make sense of their situation or surroundings. One participant described 
that he was intrigued by the location of the study. This male participant said that he found 
it peculiar that the study took place in the geology building rather than the 
communication building since it was the communication department that advertised the 
study. Another participant, a Caucasian female, noticed that one of the other participants 
was paid $3, and he was Asian. Based on these observations, the female believed that 
with her English speaking abilities she would be more likely to receive a higher payment 
on the word game. Consequently, when the female participant received her $3, a value 
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below her expectations, she was disappointed with her payment. Interestingly, this 
participant did not negotiate for more money.  
Retrospection. Central to sensemaking is the idea of retrospective understanding, 
which describes that often we often understand our environment by removing ourselves 
from the experience and then reflecting (Weick, 1979, 2001). The present study lent itself 
well to the process of retrospective sensemaking. Following the Boggle game and 
payment procedure, participants had an opportunity to reflect upon their behavior when 
they transitioned to the interview room to discuss the payment interaction. 
There was a discernible shift in perspective throughout the course of the study. 
First, participants shifted their understanding of the premise of the study and the way in 
which pay was distributed. One participant described coming to understand the pay 
distribution by saying, “I’m getting the impression that you gave everyone $3.” Another 
participant began to understand that negotiating was a central premise of our 
investigation: “Like, now looking back you gave me $3 but looking back I could have 
gotten $10.” Finally, one participant was asked if he thought it would be inappropriate to 
negotiate for more money and responded “Well, now I don’t.” In sum, while participants 
did not get much of an opportunity to collectively make sense prior to payment, 
information exchanged during the follow-up interview provided a space for interpersonal 
sensemaking.  
Transformation through talk. The follow-up interviews provided a space for 
valuable interpersonal sensemaking, which can trigger a transformation of one’s beliefs. 
Tracy and Rivera (2010) note that through conversation individuals are given the 
opportunity to explore and alter one’s personal perspective. In fact, talk often times leads 
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to transformation. Indeed, throughout the interviews, participants identified 
contradictions between their beliefs and their actions regarding negotiation. Specifically, 
when participants were asked what they thought about people who don’t negotiate, they 
often proposed that these people miss opportunities, and then they realized that they had 
missed an opportunity. Here is one instance of a participant recognizing she should have 
acted differently:  
Casey:  What do you think about people who never negotiate? 
Female: I think they should ask more, because there is no harm in asking. The 
worst thing that could happen is you would know and you are exactly where you 
were before. So maybe I should have asked for the $10. 
Another participant was asked the same question, and described people who never 
negotiate “Ummm.... I think that they miss out on a lot of chances, just like today. If I 
would have known that… then obviously…they miss out on a lot of chances.” In sum, 
the follow-up interviews proved to be a valuable opportunity for participants to better 
understand their beliefs and their actions. As a result, these transformations in perspective 
could be retained as scripts for use in future negotiation exchanges.  
Problematic Integration 
The qualitative data were also examined through the lens of problematic 
integration theory. Specifically, the data were examined to ascertain the extent to which 
participants constructed probabilities and evaluations toward the possible outcomes. First, 
probabilities were analyzed by examining the way participants believed pay was 
determined in addition to the participant’s perceived probability of attaining $10. Next, 
evaluations of the money were analyzed by examining participant’s assigned value to the 
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$3 payment and assigned value to the $10 payment. Finally, problematic dilemmas were 
examined by comparing each participant’s perceived probability to their perceived value.  
While all transcripts were analyzed for probabilities and evaluations, not all 
interviews included both of these elements. For some of the interviews, questions 
regarding probability or value were either not asked or they were not adequately 
answered. For example, one participant was asked about their odds of receiving $10 and 
responded, “Umm…that would be great!” Therefore, the total number of probabilities, 
evaluations, or problematic dilemmas did not total 86 instances. Nonetheless, the 
qualitative responses provided insight into value and probability that participants 
assigned to the outcomes of money in the present negotiation. 
Probabilistic orientations. Research question 2a probed to what extent women 
and men construct outcome probabilities. Probabilities encompass the likelihood of an 
event or outcome occurring, and this concept is foundational to the theory of PI. To 
examine the probabilities formulated by participants, the data were first examined for 
general probabilities regarding how payment was determined and then examined for the 
participant’s perceived probability of attaining the maximum $10 amount.  
General pay determination. To assess the basic payment process in this study, all 
participants were asked how they believed the $3 payment was determined. Most 
participants perceived that their payment was affected by their performance on the 
Boggle game. They thought that either the number of words, the length of the words, or 
the overall score were determinants of their $3 payment. Another common explanation 
was that pay distribution was standardized, with all participants being given the 
minimum or a fixed amount. For example, one participant said “I thought it was 
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something they just assigned to you,” and another participant said, “It’s probably just a 
fixed amount.” 
A few participants described their understanding of the pay range, and typically 
they explained that the minimum amount on the range was awarded. For example, one 
participant said “I feel like, people like, would just write like three to ten dollars, but like, 
most likely obviously they’re always gonna give out the lowest.” A few participants 
believed that it is exceedingly difficult to get 10 and that it is necessary to perform 
extremely well to get this amount. One participant explained that this standard minimum 
payment was necessary because of the many participants in the study. The other ways 
participants understood pay determination was that it was randomized or you could get 
more if you ask. Lastly a few participants simply did not know how payment was 
determined. Generally, participants perceived that the $3 payment was either a function 
of their performance or was an amount predetermined by the researchers.  
Probability of $10. The data were then examined to determine the ways 
individuals perceived their personal probability of attaining the maximum $10 payment. 
Overwhelmingly, most participants in this study expressed a negative probabilistic 
orientation meaning that they perceived they had a low probability that they would attain 
$10. Twenty-six participants expressed a negative probability, eight participants indicated 
they were uncertain or unclear of the probability of attaining $10, and six participants 
indicated a positive probability they would attain $10.  
First, most participants reported that they had a slim chance of receiving the 
maximum amount of money. Some went on to attribute their slim chance to their poor 
performance. One participant stated, “I thought I would probably get the bare minimum 
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amount of money, ‘cause I knew my words were not that great.” A few of the Asian 
participants mentioned that their lack of facility with English presented a barrier and that 
they had a difficult time forming English words, so they did not expect to earn the top 
rate.  
A number of people did not know the probability that they would receive $10. 
Specifically, participants either did not know how to estimate this probability or they did 
not consider the probability because they did not expect to receive money. One 
participant said, “To be honest, I didn’t know I could get money.” Only a handful of 
participants believed they had an average probability of attaining $10, and even fewer 
reported a high probability of attaining $10. These positive probabilities were often the 
result of either previous experiences with Boggle or a belief that higher pay for this game 
was normative. One participant said, “I assumed I was in the $5 range because that’s 
what I kinda performed on that game before.” 
Gender and probabilities. An intriguing question is whether there are gender 
differences in the perceived probability of attaining $10. Chi-square analyses were 
conducted to determine if there were statistically significant differences between women 
and men in probabilities. Results suggest no significant gender differences in 
probabilities. However, the data suggests a slight pattern of variation in the probabilistic 
orientations of women and men. Specifically, a higher percentage of men (10.8%) 
perceived a high probability of attaining $10, in comparison to women (4.1%). 
Additionally, a higher percentage of women (34.7%) perceived a low probability of 
attaining $10, in comparison to men (24.32%). In other words, men more commonly 
reported a high or positive likelihood of receiving $10.  
84 
Gender, probabilities, and propensity. Research question 2b sought to determine 
the extent to which women’s and men’s constructed outcome probabilities influenced 
their propensity to negotiate. This question is most appropriately explored by examining 
the probabilities of those who decided to initiate a negotiation for more money. However, 
this research question cannot be adequately answered given that only four participants 
initiated a negotiation.  
In sum, most participants in this study described a low or negative probability of 
attaining $10. While probabilities assigned to the outcome are useful in understanding 
motivation to acquire that object, PI theory emphasizes that probabilities do not function 
in isolation. Consequently, to attain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
propensity to negotiate it is also important to account for value assigned to the outcome.   
Evaluative orientations. Research question 2c asked to what extent women and 
men assign value to the outcome of a negotiation. According to PI theory, individuals 
maintain evaluative orientations regarding outcomes or events. In the present study, the 
value participants assigned to the baseline $3 and the upper end of $10 were both 
examined.  
The value of $3. When asked how they felt about the $3 payment, 55 participants 
referred to the money in positive terms, nine participants referenced the money in terms 
of indifference, and three participants referenced to the money in negative terms. Of the 
participants who described the money positively, words were used such as “happy”, 
“excited,” “good,” and “glad,” One participant described the value of $3 by saying “I’m 
very happy with it, I had none to come, now I have $3.” There were nine participants that 
described an indifferent evaluation of the money and indicated that they did not care 
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about the $3. This evaluation of ‘indifference’ is a concept that has yet to be introduced 
into the PI literature. That is, according to PI theory, individuals assign positive or 
negative value to an outcome. PI theory has yet to address an instance of value in which 
the individual does not care about the given outcome. In the present study, the term 
indifference describes when an individual does not care if they attain or do not attain the 
outcome. The three participants who described the $3 negatively argued that they 
deserved more, wanted more, or were disappointed with their performance. For example, 
one participant described, “I’m a little bummed. Being at the lower end of the range bugs 
me. I thought I’d come out a little better.”  
Overall, the majority of participants maintained a positive evaluation of the $3 
they were given while some referenced the $3 in negative or indifferent terms. Certainly, 
this value assigned to the baseline dollar amount is important to understanding one’s 
level of satisfaction with their situation and potentially their motivation for initiating or 
not initiating a negotiation. Additionally, it is important to consider the value assigned to 
the $10 incentive.  
The value of $10. After participants described how they felt about $3, they were 
asked how they would have felt had they been given $10 in order to determine the value 
they assigned to the $10 incentive. Similar to their evaluations of $3, participants 
overwhelmingly described the $10 in positive terms. Specifically, 44 participants 
described the value of $10 in positive terms, 16 indicated that they were indifferent or did 
not care about the value of $10, and one participant indicated a negative evaluation of the 
$10. First, most participants described $10 in positive terms and said it would have been 
better than $3, great, or fine/good. Interestingly, the value of $10 was also described in 
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terms of what the money would have meant for their performance. That is, a $10 payment 
would imply successful performance on the Boggle task. Another compelling finding was 
that many participants who viewed the $10 positively also interpreted the money in terms 
of what they could purchase with the money. All of the 12 participants who framed the 
$10 by means of what they could purchase described a type of food or a drink item that 
they could now pay for. For example, participants described they could buy lunch, 
dinner, Panda Express, three Starbucks coffee drinks, or three bags of candy.  
 Sixteen participants stated that they did not care or did not think about the $10. 
Participants made comments such as “I wasn’t overly concerned about it,” or “It’s maybe 
a two or three on the scale. It’s not that important.” Finally, one participant assigned 
negative value to the money and said if given $10 they “Would have felt guilty, that 
would be too much.” This participant was a female.  
In sum, if we are to examine value alone, participants assigned positive value to 
both $3 and $10. That is, while many participants perceived that it would be great or nice 
to get $10, they also positively valued the baseline $3 they were given. As previously 
described, participants often described the relative difference between $3 and $10 as 
marginal, simply an extra bag of candy, an extra Starbucks, a $7 difference that one 
person described wouldn’t “make or break” them. Thus, while many of the participants 
assigned positive value to the $10, this positive value alone was not enough to motivate 
them to initiate a negotiation. These findings suggest that evaluative orientations are 
complex. In this study, evaluative orientations proved to be a function of the value 
assigned to the baseline pay, the top pay, and the margin between the two.   
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Gender and evaluations. Gender differences in evaluative orientations were 
examined in relation to value assigned to both the $3 payment and the $10 incentive. 
Gender differences in evaluative orientations were examined using chi-square analyses 
and frequency counts.  
For the $3 payment, women (57.1%) tended to assign more positive value than 
(48.7%). In addition, a higher proportion of men (13.5%) reported feeling indifferent 
about the $3 baseline pay in comparison to the proportion of women (8.2%). Despite the 
pattern of gender and $3 value, this trend was not statistically significant. For the $10 
payment, a higher proportion of women expressed positive value (74.4%) in comparison 
to the proportion of men (40.5%). In other words, women viewed the $10 payment more 
positively than men. Results of a chi-square test demonstrate that these proportions are 
statistically significant [χ² (85) = 3.2, p < .001]; thus, women are more likely to assign 
positive value to $10 in comparison to men. Taken together, a greater proportion of 
women assigned positive value to $3 and significantly more value to the $10 payment. At 
the same time, men were more frequently indifferent to the $3 and $10 payment, relative 
to women. See table 3 for number and percentages of all probabilities and evaluations. 
See figure 2 for a bar chart of the probabilities and evaluations of women and men.  
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Table 3 
Gender Comparisons for Reasons, Probabilities, and Evaluations  
N % N %
Reasons for NOT Negotiating
Extra Credit 15 30.61% 8 21.62% 8.99% 0.35
Helping Research 12 24.49% 9 24.32% 0.17% 0.98
Take What You're Given 7 14.29% 5 13.51% 0.77% 0.92
Don’t Care About the Money 5 10.20% 9 24.32% 14.12% 0.08
Small Margin 1 2.04% 4 10.81% 8.77% 0.23
Already Being Given Something 4 8.16% 0 0.00% 8.16% 0.07
Rude or Innappropriate 8 16.33% 1 2.70% 13.62% 0.04*
Out of Character 3 6.12% 1 2.70% 3.42% 0.46
Didn't Think About It 0 0.00% 2 5.41% 5.41% 0.10
Risks 0 0.00% 1 2.70% 2.70% 0.25
Probability of $10
Positive Probability 2 4.08% 4 10.81% 6.73% 0.23
Negative Probability 17 34.69% 9 24.32% 10.37% 0.30
Uncertain Probability 6 12.24% 2 5.41% 6.84% 0.28
VALUE of $3
Positive Value 28 57.14% 18 48.65% 8.49% 0.44
Negative Value 2 4.08% 1 2.70% 1.38% 0.23
Indifferent Evaluation 4 8.16% 5 13.51% 5.35% 0.43
Value of $10
Positive Value 29 74.36% 15 40.54% 33.82% 0.002**
Negative Value 1 2.04% 0 0% 2.04% 0.38
Indifferent Value 10 20.41% 6 16.22% 4.19% 0.62
Means High Performance 4 8.16% 2 5.41% 2.76% 0.62
*Significant effects have a two-tailed alpha level below .05
**Significant effects have a two-tailed alpha level below .01
Women Men Code Difference p-value
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Figure 2. Bar chart of the probabilities and evaluations of women and men.  
Gender, evaluations, and propensity. Research question 2d asks how the value 
assigned by women and men influences the decision to initiate a negotiation. This 
question is most appropriately addressed by examining the evaluative orientations held 
by the individuals who negotiated for more money. However, this research question 
cannot be adequately answered given that only four participants initiated a negotiation for 
more money.  
Problematic dilemmas. Research question 2e asked the question to what extent 
do participants indicate that problematic dilemmas are the reason they avoid negotiations 
(i.e., divergence, ambiguity, ambivalence, and impossibility). According to PI theory, 
probabilities and evaluations are intertwined and can result in problematic dilemmas. 
Problematic dilemmas are instances “when expectations and desires diverge, when we are 
uncertain about something valuable, when we experience ambivalence, and when we face 
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impossible desires” (Matthias & Babrow, 2007, p. 788). It is under these problematic 
circumstances that people might opt to increase uncertainty, because these problematic 
dilemmas have the potential to instigate negative feelings (Babrow, 2001). Problematic 
integration theory describes that probabilistic and evaluative orientations can take four 
problematic forms. All four problematic dilemmas occurred in the data.   
Ambiguity involves situations with either multiple meanings or where the odds 
are unclear or hazy. In essence, the individual does not know the probability of an event 
occurring because of a lack of information or contradictory information (Babrow, 2001). 
As noted previously, there were many occasions in which participants did not know the 
likelihood that they would be able to attain the maximum $10. In total, there were 27 
participants who described feeling uncertain about the score determination. In addition, 
eight participants did not know their likelihood of attaining $10. Thus, ambiguity was 
also a frequent dilemma for participants in this study.  
 Divergence was a problematic dilemma commonly experienced by participants. 
Divergence is a situation in which probabilities and evaluations diverge from one 
another. That is, the outcome is valued but the probability of obtaining that object is low. 
In this study, divergence came in the form of a low perceived probability of obtaining 
$10 and a positive evaluation of that $10 payment. In other words, most participants did 
not perceive they had a chance of earning $10 but would have been happy to receive $10. 
There were 13 instances of divergence found in the data. For example, one participant 
said his probability of earning $10 was “Not very likely, I’m really tired and I didn’t 
know I would have to make words.” This participant also said indicated that he would 
have highly valued $10, “It would be awesome, but beggars can’t be choosers.” Thus, the 
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high value of the $10 and the negative probability expressed by this participant would be 
considered as divergence by PI theory. Babrow (2001) notes that these situations can 
potentially trigger emotions such as sorrow, embarrassment, shame, disappointment or 
frustration.  
Impossibility occurs when one perceives something is not attainable. Again, 25 
participants perceived that there was a slim chance that they would receive the $10. Of 
these, there were 11 that described their slim chances as an ‘impossibility’ meaning that 
there was no way that they would earn $10 for their performance in the game. For 
example, one participant said, “I don’t think anyone had a chance of getting $10. I think 
everyone was just given $3” and another participant said “I’d have to say my chances are 
really, really low.” So there were many participants that perceived a low probability and a 
subset of these indicated that earning $10 would be a near ‘impossibility.’ 
Ambivalence is a problematic dilemma that occurs when the available options are 
mutually attractive or unattractive. For example, one might hesitate to negotiate when one 
desires money but also desires to maintain a harmony in the relationship. There were a 
few situations that depict the experience of ambivalence. First, ambivalence was 
experienced by the 11 participants that perceived negotiating would be rude or 
inappropriate, many of whom were women. Ambivalence was also experienced by the 
nine participants that indicated negotiating would be a risky social endeavor. Another 
instance of ambivalence was clearly experienced by one participant who described that he 
did not negotiate because he would risk losing the money he had been given. This 
ambivalent participant explained, “I have extra credit riding on it. I wouldn’t want to 
mess it up by asking for more money.” 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
The present research study adds to the literature on the propensity to initiate 
negotiations by adopting an underused methodological approach: mixed methods. The 
aim of this study was to partially replicate previous research (Small et al., 2007) and to 
re-examine the role of gender in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. Results of the 
quantitative phase of this study contradict previous findings (Erikkson & Sanders, 2012; 
Small et al., 2007) and suggest that no gender differences exist in the propensity to 
initiate a negotiation. As an extension to the study by Small et al. (2007), follow-up 
interviews were conducted to explore the reasons why participants chose to negotiate or 
not. Results from the qualitative phase help explain the absence of gender differences in 
the propensity to negotiate, and at the same time, support and expand the known 
explanations for why individuals do not initiate negotiations.  
The present study also explored the extent to which the theoretical frameworks of 
sensemaking and PI were implicated by women and men in their decisions to initiate a 
negotiation. Indeed, sensemaking was prominent in this negotiation scenario and exuded 
instances of uncertainty, information seeking, retrospection, and transformation through 
conversation. Furthermore, PI theory provided insight into the way probabilities and 
evaluations relate to the propensity to negotiate. Moreover, the patterns of responses in 
the PI data suggest slight variance in the way women and men construct probabilities and 
evaluations. This chapter will discuss each of these findings and explain how findings are 
consistent or discordant with current literature.  
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Interpretation of Findings 
Gender differences in the propensity to negotiate were absent in the quantitative 
data. These findings diverge from the findings by Small et al. (2007) who demonstrated 
that women were less likely to negotiate than men. In fact, the rate of negotiating was 
lower in this study than in the study by Small et al. (2007). In the present study, 4.7% of 
participants initiated a negotiation compared to 12.2% of participants in the study by 
Small et al. (2007). The current study may have had lower negotiating rates foremost 
because this study included the added incentive of course extra credit. Participants 
approached this study as an opportunity to increase their course standing and anything 
beyond that, such as money, was of minimal interest. Second, the rate of negotiating in 
this study might have been rather low due to the many participants that indicated they 
were Asian (41% Asian) and many expressed a reverence for collectivist values. 
Additionally, the low rate of negotiating could have been because participants were 
financially secure (42.2% reported parental income exceeding $80,000). The interviews 
in the qualitative phase support and elaborate on these findings. At the same time, the 
qualitative interviews provide new insight as to why participants did not initiate a 
negotiation.  
The qualitative interviews allowed participants to reveal the reasons why they did 
not initiate a negotiation. Many of the reasons are consistent with previous research 
findings on the reasons individuals do not negotiate: it was not the main objective, 
participants did not care about the money, and they performed poorly. The present results 
also broaden these reasons to include novel reasons for not initiating a negotiation: 
participants were volunteering/helping research, did not earn it, and that one should take 
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what one is given. One final reason for the avoidance of a negotiation revealed significant 
gender differences: women were more likely than men to not negotiate because they were 
concerned with being rude or inappropriate. The explanations participants provided for 
why they did not initiate a negotiation were compelling and have practical significance in 
that they can help us to understand some of the reasons individuals, particularly women, 
might hesitate to initiate negotiations. 
Explanations for the Avoidance of a Negotiation 
One of the main reasons participants did not initiate a negotiation is that they were 
not interested in the money. A number of participants indicated they simply did not care 
about the money, which aligns with demographic data indicating high parental income. 
Additionally, participants indicated that the difference between $3 and $10 was too small 
to motivate them to initiate a negotiation. The propensity literature has suggested that an 
important motivating factor in the propensity to negotiate is the desirability of the given 
outcome (Volkema, 2006). Therefore, without much interest in the $10 incentive, 
participants had little reason to initiate a negotiation.  
Another reason participants did not initiate a negotiation is that money was not 
their purpose/objective, but rather they were strictly interested in attaining extra credit. 
While many did not care about or need money, it also seems that money was not the 
purpose/objective of many of the participants as they were too narrowly focused on the 
extra credit that they overlooked the additional money available on the negotiation table. 
With two incentives offered in exchange for participation, this negotiation could be 
classified as a multi-issue negotiation. Negotiation scholars have argued that multi-issue 
negotiations diminish the clarity of purpose for the negotiator; therefore they are more 
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likely to leave value on the negotiation table (Volkema, 2006). In other words, as the 
number of objectives in a negotiation increases, so does the likelihood that the negotiator 
will hesitate to negotiate or abandon the negotiation altogether. Thus, the rate of 
negotiating may have been partly diminished by participants’ inability to pursue multiple 
objectives.  
The next reason participants did not initiate a negotiation is because they framed 
the situation as an opportunity to volunteer or help research. According to Weick (1995), 
social context is central to the construction of meaning. In the context of this research 
study, participants’ behavior was guided by the rules/scripts of a research study rather 
than a wage negotiation. The perception of this study as a volunteer activity speaks to the 
external validity of this research design. This “volunteer” activity was understood as a 
situation that should not be reciprocated with payment, nonetheless a negotiated payment. 
As such, the practicality or external validity of this study may have been tenuous and the 
situation may have inadequately paralleled an actual wage negotiation. These findings are 
noteworthy because they might help to explain the rather lower rate of negotiating in this 
study and similar laboratory experiments (Erikkson & Sanders, 2012; Small et al., 2007). 
The rate of negotiating might have been largely diminished by the academic setting and 
might be more common in a professional environment.  
The next explanation, that money should be earned, was both a reason for not 
negotiating and a common theme throughout the data. Participants indicated they would 
prefer to negotiate their salary after they have started working for a company and they 
have had the chance to prove themselves. In addition, participants reported negative 
perceptions of people who always negotiate and people who never negotiate. In fact, 
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many participants suggested there is a “happy medium” in negotiating which involves 
asking for things that are deserved or desired but not asking too much all of the time. 
Literature has demonstrated that reciprocity, repaying what is given, is a virtue that is 
valued by communities across the globe (Cialdini, 2001). Thus, the avoidance of a 
negotiation because it has not been earned might be considered as a laudable response. 
Clearly the norm of reciprocity is valued by many of our participants who believe it is 
important to prove one’s self before requesting money. This idea of proving oneself 
before negotiating provides some insight as to why many individuals might choose to 
avoid negotiating a starting salary. While the idea that money should be earned seems 
intuitive, it has yet to be addressed by the propensity literature.  
The notion that ‘money should be earned’ by proving oneself is logical, but it has 
the potential to be problematic. Negotiations often take place before the value of the 
object has been conveyed. For example, starting salary is settled before employees have 
had the opportunity to demonstrate their ability and their value at that particular 
organization, unless the newly hired employee was promoted internally. It is important 
for employees to assess their knowledge, skills and abilities and then negotiate for a wage 
that is commensurate with those qualifications (Babcock & Laschever, 2009). Waiting to 
prove one’s qualifications to each new employer will result in a stunted starting salary 
and lower lifetime earnings. Heedful consideration of one’s starting salary offer is 
considered to be paramount since these initial wages have been shown to strongly relate 
to lifetime earnings (Gerhart, 1990). Thus, it is imperative that new employees have a 
thorough understanding of their worth and compare this with the salary they have been 
offered, then if necessary, initiate a negotiation for a higher and more reasonable wage. 
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Experts advise that goals should be set as high as you can justify (Shell, 2001), and this is 
true of a starting salary negotiation in which your worth has yet to be validated.  
Participants also expressed that they did not initiate a negotiation because they 
thought they should take what they were given and trust the procedures for payment. This 
alludes to the influence of power in negotiation, a factor discussed by Small et al. (2007). 
They demonstrated that those who perceive they have greater power are more likely to 
initiate negotiations. This concept of taking what you are given can also be likened to 
another predictor of negotiation propensity: locus of control. According to Rotter, (1966), 
those with an external locus of control perceive that others are in control of their life 
circumstances, and therefore they are less motivated to exert effort towards these ends. 
Early scholarship suggested that women were less likely to negotiate because they were 
more likely to have an external locus of control and did not perceive their actions would 
be influential in attaining negotiation outcomes (Babcock & Laschever, 2003). In fact, 
women are essentially correct in assuming their actions are counterproductive since 
women are more often punished for asking (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 
2007).  
While gender differences in locus of control were not detected, this study found 
that many did not initiate a negotiation because they perceived that the confederate and 
researcher controlled the pay allocation. While the acceptance of payment is somewhat 
similar to findings on power and locus of control, the present findings provides more 
context as to how these factors affect propensity in an actual negotiation situation. The 
claim that locus of control relates to propensity has been demonstrated with correlational 
data from quantitative surveys (Babcock et al., 2006). The argument that power relates to 
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propensity was demonstrated in an experimental design that demonstrated that 
individuals primed to perceive themselves as powerful are more likely to initiate a 
negotiation (Small et al., 2007). In this study, participants recounted their understanding 
of why they did not negotiate and they explained that one should do as they are told and 
take what they are given. Therefore, the findings presented here demonstrate how 
obedience to payment procedures can result in a missed opportunity to negotiate.   
For many, the notion of taking what you are given in the context of this study 
served as a parallel for actual wage negotiations. The incentive payment in this study was 
advertised in the form of a range: from $3 to $10. Similarly, job advertisements often list 
a salary in the form of a range from the lowest to the maximum amount that can be 
earned. Participants detected this parallel and described that the minimum amount in a 
salary range is typically the amount that is allocated. Taken together, adhering to a 
system of payment and not questioning pay determination can prove to be problematic 
and could result in significant lost wages over an extended period of time (Babcock & 
Laschever, 2003; Bowles, Babcock & Lai, 2007; Bowles, Babcock & McGinn, 2005; 
Gerhart & Rynes, 1991).  
One final reason that participants did not initiate a negotiation is that it was 
considered to be rude or out of character. Interestingly, this explanation was more likely 
to be reported by women than men, a finding which was also outlined in chapter four. 
Another question in the interview asked participants about the specific risks they 
perceived in negotiating. Results support that women frequently expressed concerns over 
being judged or denied, more frequently than men. Thus, social consequences in this 
study were more commonly a concern for women in comparison to men.  
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Furthermore, the scholarly literature supports their concerns are potentially 
warranted. Research has demonstrated that women are more commonly penalized for 
negotiating job offers in comparison to men. It is suggested that the self-interestedness 
and assertion implied by the act of a negotiating is a violation of traditional female 
gender norms (Kray & Thompson, 2004). Moreover, women understand these social risks 
and expect to be judged and possibly penalized for negotiating (Bowles et al., 2007). 
While this study did not examine the extent that participants were actually perceived as 
rude, results do suggest that the concern for propriety more commonly deterred women 
from negotiating than men.  
Communication Theory and the Propensity to Negotiate 
 A notable contribution of this study is that it draws from two communication 
theories, sensemaking and PI theory, to explain how individuals respond to negotiating 
opportunities. Sensemaking serves as a frame to explore the experience of uncertainty 
and one’s response to this uncertainty as well as provides insight into the essential social 
processes used during negotiation interactions. In addition, PI theory serves as a useful 
theoretical foundation to examine the probabilities, evaluations, and problematic 
dilemmas constructed by participants as they made decisions about negotiating. Taken 
together, sensemaking and PI theory shed new light on the propensity to initiate a 
negotiation.  
Sensemaking and propensity. Sensemaking proved to be a prominent process in 
this ambiguous negotiation scenario. Two prominent benchmarks of social life as well as 
sensemaking theory are that meaning is co-created and is invigorated by moments of 
transformation. In the absence of others in this study, participants struggled to make 
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sense of what was happening and had difficulty determining what they should do. 
However, through conversation participants were able to retrospectively make sense of 
their actions. Thus, sensemaking helps to explain individual thoughts and actions and also 
suggests that one of the most valuable assets in a negotiation is collective social 
knowledge.  
Sense is often made with others. Social resources help us to understand our 
environment and determine an appropriate course of action (Weick, 1995). In the absence 
of information and with few social resources, participants had difficulty determining the 
appropriate norms to guide their behavior. It was not clear whether negotiating would be 
an appropriate course of action. Participants acknowledged this lack of social information 
by stating it would have been helpful to know how other participants performed.  
Access to social resources is considered an asset in negotiations. Scholars have 
acknowledged that comparative data is invaluable for negotiation success (Volkema, 
2009). In their model of propensity to negotiate, Volkema and Fleck (2012) consider 
vicarious experience to be a predictor of initiating a negotiation. The authors 
acknowledge that we learn from our own experiences in life but we also learn from the 
experiences of others. Not only does social information divulge whether negotiation is 
possible, but it also details the range of what is negotiable. It has been demonstrated that 
knowing the specific standards of pay for a specific job or industry can be exceedingly 
advantageous. Bowles et al. (2005) demonstrated that comparative salary data increases 
the rate of negotiating and results in more equitable pay, which is particularly important 
for women who are traditionally underpaid. 
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Much of the negotiation literature emphasizes the importance of research and 
preparation to fully understand the scope of what is negotiable and the norms and 
standards for the situation (Fisher, & Ertel, 1995; Shell, 2001). Wheeler (2012) suggests 
that information is power in a negotiation, and whichever negotiator has a clearer sense 
of what is possible has the advantage. This study broadens these suggestions by stressing 
the importance of seeking information in all situations, even those that are not 
immediately perceived as negotiable opportunities. Indeed, the few participants in this 
study who negotiated all engaged in future-oriented thought by closely determining their 
worth in this study prior to the exchange of money. They recognized that preparation is 
critical.  
 While forethought is important, retrospect proved to be similarly valuable. The 
sensemaking concept of retrospect was evident in the follow-up interviews. Retrospect, 
according to Weick, suggests that action is often preceded by thought and reflection 
(2005). Indeed, participants often took action without prudent calculation of the 
consequences of their actions. For many participants, it was only through the interviews 
that they came to understand their environment, the consequences of their actions, and 
themselves. For example, participants came to understand that payment was negotiable 
and perhaps they should have negotiated given the few risks involved. Taken together, 
findings suggest how sensemaking can be invaluable in a negotiation, particularly when 
the prospect of a negotiation is not imminent.  
Problematic integration and propensity. Problematic integration theory 
maintains that a given outcome is viewed in terms of the probability of this event, the 
evaluation of this event, and the integration of these two orientations. First, the evaluation 
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or allure of a given outcome is influential in the decision to pursue this outcome, both 
generally (Babrow, 2001) and in the context of a negotiation (Volkema, 2006, 2009). In 
other words, when an outcome is desired, it is then pursued. While participants in this 
study assigned positive value to the $10 incentive, participants also assigned positive 
value to the $3 payment they had already been given. Furthermore, PI theory maintains 
that evaluations do not function in isolation. Participants in this study perceived a 
negative or low probability of attaining the $10 incentive. Taken together, while 
participants were enticed by the $10 incentive, they may not have negotiated because of 
two other factors: they were satisfied with their baseline $3, and they perceived a low 
probability of attaining the $10. Thus, the way in which probabilities and evaluations are 
interconnected has meaningful implications for one’s propensity to initiate a negotiation. 
As such, it is also important to consider the way probabilities and evaluations collide by 
examining problematic dilemmas.  
The integration of probabilities and evaluations. The nonexperimental design of 
this study is such that the relationship between probabilities and evaluations can only be 
inferred as correlational relationships and not as causational relationships. Though the 
influence of problematic dilemmas, when probabilities and values diverge (Babrow, 
2001), is purely speculative, these dilemmas provide insight into the way probabilities 
and evaluations collided in the propensity to initiate negotiations. The dilemmas 
experienced by participants in this study reflect ambiguity, impossibility, and divergence. 
Divergence, the desire for an outcome that is improbable (Babrow, 2001), may help to 
explain why participants in this study did not seek information to reduce uncertainty. 
That is, while participants often desired the $10, they were also unsure or pessimistic 
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regarding whether or not they were able to attain the desired outcome. The absence of 
certainty seemed to contribute to the inertia exhibited by participants in the propensity to 
negotiate.  
Another important property worth noting about probabilities and evaluations is 
that they are interrelated (Babrow, 2001). Again while only speculative, it is certainly 
possible that participants adjusted their evaluations or probabilities to mitigate negative 
emotions that result from problematic dilemmas. For example, to combat the negative 
probability or poor odds of earning $10, it seems that participants bolstered their 
evaluation of the $3 payment to frame the situation more optimistically. For example, one 
participant indicated his odds of $10 were “probably not that high, I didn’t make that 
many words.” This participant then was asked about the value of money and he indicated 
“$10 probably would have been better, but $3 is fine.” Thus, positive value was assigned 
to the baseline payment possibly due to the low probability of attaining the higher $10 
payment. While the specific way in which probabilities and evaluations integrate is not 
easily discernable from this study, theory suggests that probabilities and evaluations are 
interconnected and do not function in isolation (McPhee & Zaug, 2001). Interestingly, the 
probabilistic and evaluative orientations of women and men demonstrated slight variance.   
Gender and problematic integration. From the perspective of PI theory, there is 
some evidence to suggest that women and men vary in the way they construct 
probabilities and evaluative orientations. First, probabilistic orientations tend to be 
formulated somewhat inversely by women and men in the context of a negotiation. 
Though marginal and not statistically significant, a larger percentage of men perceived a 
high probability of earning the maximum $10 payment while a higher percentage of 
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women perceived their probability of attaining $10 was low. Negotiation scholars would 
liken these probabilities to expectations, which are believed to affect behavior during 
negotiations. High or positive expectations cause individuals to be committed and 
persistent in a negotiation (Shell, 2001) while negative expectations can become 
disappointingly self-fulfilling (Wheeler, 2013).   
The present findings regarding gender differences in probabilities are consistent 
with much of the literature regarding gender and expectations. Research has consistently 
demonstrated that men tend to maintain expectations that are inflated in comparison to 
women. For example, one survey of college students demonstrated that male students had 
higher expectations for their future salary in comparison to their female classmates 
(Martin, 1989), perhaps because of the abundant evidence supporting that men earn more 
money (Gerhart, 1990; Hegewisch, et al., 2010; Hegewisch, et al., 2012). In negotiation 
scenarios, women tend to set lower aspirations and are willing to accept lower payment 
than are men (Eckel, de Oliveira, & Grossman, 2008; O’Connor & Arnold, 2006). Thus, 
the finding that women did not perceive a high likelihood of attaining $10 is not 
surprising, despite the quantitative evidence that women and men performed similarly in 
this study in the Boggle game.  
Second, the evaluative orientations or value assigned by women and men 
demonstrate patterns of variation. Findings suggest that women tended to assign positive 
value to both the $3 and $10 payment, while men exuded less excitement over either of 
the payment amounts. Examining this evaluative data suggests that women might not 
have negotiated because they were satisfied with the initial $3 they were given. Crosby 
(1984) detailed the paradox of the female worker is that she tends to earn less and tends 
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to be happier with less, and this claim has been supported by empirical research (Jost, 
1997). Conversely, men might not have initiated a negotiation because they were not 
enticed by the $10 incentive. Another reason men might not have negotiated is that they 
were attempting to maintain face after being told that they missed an opportunity to 
negotiate. One study by Bryans (1999) asked professionals to recount mistakes they had 
made in the workplace. Interestingly, men took longer to report making a mistake and 
were more likely to shift the blame of their mistakes to others. Conversely, women more 
quickly acknowledged mistakes and were more accountable and apologetic for their 
mistakes. Therefore, the variation between women and men in value assigned to the 
money might be authentic beliefs about the money or might be an attempt to maintain 
face or make sense of the outcome of their performance. Taken together, results of this 
study suggest women were satisfied with whatever payment they were given while men 
tended to express a sentiment of indifference to the money.  
An interesting finding within the data is that women were significantly more 
likely than men to assign positive value to the $10 incentive. At first blush, the evaluative 
orientations uncovered in this study contradict the stereotypical values of women and 
men. Considerable literature suggests that women tend to value and privilege 
relationships while men privilege monetary gains (Halpern & McClean Parks, 1996; Kray 
& Gelfand, 2009). However, the evaluative orientations revealed here suggest that 
women do value money but are happier with less, which is consistent with theoretical 
arguments regarding gender and money. For example, it has been argued that women 
have lower pay expectations as they have a lower internal standard with which they 
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evaluate money (Sauser & York, 1978). At the same time, with a higher standard of pay 
expectations, men need a higher dollar amount to be motivated to take action.  
In sum, through the lens of PI theory, there is some evidence to suggest that 
women and men vary in the way they construct probabilities and evaluative orientations. 
These findings provide new insight into the underlying inclinations and motivations held 
by women and men in the propensity to negotiate. According to PI theory, women’s 
decision to avoid a negotiation could have occurred because while they found the $10 
incentive appealing, they perceived they were not likely to attain this money. 
Additionally, women were satisfied with the $3 baseline pay they had already been given. 
For men, the decision to avoid a negotiation could have been be a function of the 
indifference assigned to the $10 incentive, despite their perceived high probability of 
attaining the $10. Thus, to fully grasp the decision to avoid a negotiation it is important to 
consider the juxtaposition of both probabilistic and evaluative orientations. 
Theoretical Extension 
 According to Babrow (2001) Problematic Integration theory suggests that 
individuals construct probabilistic and evaluative orientations to a given event or 
outcome. The theory further states that these orientations, probabilistic and evaluative, 
are either positive or negative. However, the present exploration suggests that the 
bifurcation of positive and negative orientations does not fully encompass all potential 
orientations that can be constructed by individuals. Firstly, results in this study suggest 
that many participants maintained ‘uncertain’ probabilistic orientations towards the 
outcome -- receiving $10. Participants either gave little consideration to the probability of 
getting $10 or did not know how to go about determining their probability of earning $10. 
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Secondly, a number of participants maintained an evaluative orientation of ‘indifference’ 
in that they did not care about the $10 incentive in this study. Thus, there were some 
individuals who did not assign positive or negative value toward the $10 payment, but 
their orientations were somewhere in between these two extremes. Phillips (1990) argues 
that theory should aim to comprehensively explain the phenomenon under scientific 
investigation. Consequently, PI theory would benefit from an expansion of the bifurcated 
positive and negative orientations to include additional categorizations of uncertainty and 
indifference.  
Contributions of the Present Study 
The present study broadens the negotiation literature to adopt two underused 
epistemological approaches: qualitative methods and mixed methods. The bulk of the 
work on the propensity to negotiate has been quantitative in nature (e.g., Babcock et al., 
2006; Bowles et al., 2007; Erikkson & Sanders, 2012; Small et al., 2007; Volkema & 
Fleck, 2012), likely because this previous work has been conducted in the fields of 
psychology and business -- fields which have been dominated by quantitative approaches 
since their inception (Danziger, 1985). While quantitative methods have proved useful 
for theory testing, this approach is fairly inflexible. This study has demonstrated the 
flexibility of qualitative research in that it offers an opportunity to ask open-ended 
questions and explore the rich, descriptive, and wide-ranging participant responses that 
are often unanticipated by the researcher (Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest, & 
Namey, 2005). Indeed, there were countless surprises revealed by participants in their 
explanations of why they decided to avoid initiating a negotiation, and these surprises 
yield constructive avenues for future research.  
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A second contribution of this study is that it furthers the application of theory to 
the literature on the propensity to negotiate. Moreover, it is the first known study to use a 
communicative approach to investigate the propensity to negotiate. While communication 
is described as an essential skill that is central to the negotiation process (Glenn & 
Susskind, 2010; Putnam, 2010; Putnam & Kolb, 2000; Putnam & Roloff, 1992; Schoop, 
Köhne, & Ostertag, 2010), little attention has been given to the role of communication in 
the propensity to initiate a negotiation. The present study is guided by two 
communication theories, sensemaking and problematic integration, to specifically 
consider the role of communication in responding to uncertainty. Communication theory 
provides valuable insight how the absence or presence of communicative knowledge 
informs our understanding of who is propelled to negotiate and who is not.  
In sum, the present investigation is among the first to investigate the propensity to 
negotiate from a qualitative/mixed-method approach and also with the guidance of 
communication theory. Taken together, these unique contributions make the present 
study one that adopts a fresh approach to exploring gender differences in the propensity 
to initiate a negotiation. 
Implications 
The findings of this study have important implications for a variety of potential 
negotiators. Foremost, the information revealed through the 86 interviews in this study 
suggest that participants did not recognize the opportunity to negotiate. During the study, 
participants were noticeably disinterested in their surroundings. Participants were mostly 
unclear about the study and gave minimal forethought to what would be happening. 
Recognizing negotiable opportunities is a critical step in the process of negotiating 
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(Babcock et al., 2006; Small et al., 2007; Volkema & Fleck, 2012), and both women and 
men in this study missed the opportunity. One approach for augmenting the rate of 
recognizing opportunities is by drawing from the knowledge and experience of mentors 
and contacts in one’s social network (Burt, 1992; Forret & Sullivan, 2002). Exchanges 
with others can provide information regarding what is negotiable and strategies for 
optimizing those requests (Bowles et al., 2005); a social process akin to sensemaking.  
There is also value in preparing for social exchanges, like a negotiable 
opportunity such as this one. While it would have been difficult to know this opportunity 
was negotiable it would have been useful to research the parameters of the experiment, 
either by asking questions of peers or the researchers. Relationships or situations that are 
demarcated by the exchange of value should be well prepared for and participants should 
maintain vigilance throughout. Ubiquitously, scholars argue that a willingness to prepare 
is one of the most important negotiation techniques that results in superior outcomes for 
all parties (Cialdini, 2001; Shell, 2001). In fact, Fisher and Ertel (1995) have argued that 
a lack of preparation is one of the most serious handicaps in a negotiation. Indeed, an 
important finding from this study is that recognizing opportunities and preparedness often 
prove to be invaluable efforts. 
The discovery of cultural differences in the propensity to negotiate has important 
implications. Though not a focal investigation of this study, the differences between 
Asian and Caucasian participants was undeniable and suggests that culture has a 
profound effect on the propensity to initiate a negotiation. Many of the Asian participants 
portrayed negotiating as an inappropriate social gaffe, but Caucasians less frequently 
expressed this sentiment. While a few women in this study did express that negotiating 
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would be a rude violation of social rules, these reactions were less frequent than the 
Asian participants and were of scant concern for Caucasian men. Indeed there is a wealth 
of literature suggesting that collectivist cultures, such as East Asian countries and Latin 
American countries, value the collective good, unity, and social cohesion. In contrast, 
individualistic cultures, such as the United States and Australia, value independence, self-
reliance, and thus the pursuit of individual goals, such as the pursuit of negotiation 
outcomes (Acuff, 2006; Hofstede, 2001;Volkema, 2012; Volkema & Fleck, 2012). These 
findings related to cultural differences caution that perhaps we should be giving greater 
consideration to the way cultural values affect one’s decision to engage or avoid a 
negotiation.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
A few limitations of this study warrant acknowledgement. Foremost, this study 
was only a partial replication study and did not precisely replicate the procedures 
undergone by Small et al. (2007). The present study differed with the inclusion of an 
extra credit incentive. This additional incentive seemed to minimize the rate of 
negotiating in a way that complicated the identification of gender differences. It likely 
would have been simpler to parse out gender differences had the extra incentive been 
removed from the study. However, in the absence of extra credit, it would have been 
rather difficult to stimulate participation from a college population, a suspicion of ours 
that was reinforced by similar comments from participants.  
Another limitation is that generalizability is not perfect with lab studies. This 
study was conducted in a college laboratory in comparison to a professional work 
environment. In the context of an actual work environment the act of negotiating would 
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likely be a more realistic and routine social activity. Indeed, comments from participants 
suggested that they perceived this artificiality in the way they framed their participation 
as a helping or volunteer activity. As such, the artificiality of the setting limits the 
number of parallels that can be drawn between this study and actual wage negotiations.  
The sample population presents another limitation in this study. While any sample 
population will have drawbacks and there are a few notable limitations of the present 
sample. First, this sample consisted of a large portion of Asian international students and 
this population was less inclined to negotiate for a few reasons. The Asian sample 
generally had lower Boggle scores, reported subpar personal performance, acknowledged 
a language barrier, and perceived negotiating would be an inappropriate behavior. The 
large number of Asian participants confounds the ability to draw straightforward gender 
differences in the propensity to initiate a negotiation. A second limitation of this sample 
is that the sample was solely comprised of college students, thus generalizability to other 
samples is tenuous. College samples are critiqued with claims that this group tells us little 
about how the rest of the 'real world' operates. However, methodologists refute this 
argument by suggesting that college students inform us of whether a phenomenon can 
happen or if a phenomenon ought to happen under certain conditions (Bordens & Abbott, 
2002; Mook, 1983). On one hand, this sample of college students has had limited 
exposure to actual work experiences. However, research on the socialization of work 
demonstrates that young people have an elaborate understanding of work prior to 
attaining a 'real job' (Clair, 1999). Further, the previous work on the propensity to initiate 
negotiations exclusively relied on college samples (Erikkson & Sanders, 2012; Small et 
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al., 2007). Therefore, this sample of college students was perhaps more appropriate and 
advantageous than not.  
The propensity scholarship is in early stages of development, thus there are many 
possible directions for future research. Thus far, the research that has been conducted 
related to gender and propensity has been homogenous, and has largely focused on one-
time negotiations amongst strangers (Kray & Thompson, 2005). While this literature is 
valuable in that it offers increased experimental control (Bendersky & McGinn 2008), 
one-time negotiations are only a small range of human interactions and diminish the 
number of relational concerns that could arise. In fact, negotiations are often conducted 
amidst established relationships and can occur across a number of meetings. Moreover, 
women and men tend to reap social benefits differently; social dominance is 
advantageous for men yet unfavorable for women (Campbell, 1999; Eagly & Karau, 
2002; Maccoby, 1990). It is likely that in narrowing on one-time negotiations researchers 
are overlooking the value women can access in long-term negotiation relationships. 
Future research on propensity would benefit from examining a broader range of 
relationships, particularly given gender differences in norms and roles.  
Another significantly underdeveloped area is the literature related to multi-issue 
negotiations. First, while some have theorized the way multi-issue negotiations affect the 
propensity to initiate these exchanges (Volkema, 2009), few have conducted actual multi-
issue negotiation experiments. Further, the role of gender in multi-issue negotiations has 
yet to be explored. The study by Small et al. (2007) was a single-issue negotiation while 
the present study included two issues, and it remains an unanswered question of whether 
the additional incentive caused gender differences to be extinguished. In other words, this 
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study found that gender differences in the rate of negotiating were nonexistent and this 
might have been the result of research design and the context of this dual-issue 
negotiation.  
A controversial and continuously developing body of research has been 
examining gender differences in brain connectivity and therefore differences in the ability 
to perform with multiple tasks. Scholars have recently suggested that that the neural 
wiring of women and men is different which leads to differences in performance 
depending on the number of issues or tasks. “On average, men are more likely better at 
learning and performing a single task at hand, like cycling or navigating directions, 
whereas women have superior memory and social cognition skills, making them more 
equipped for multitasking and creating solutions that work for a group” (Ingalhalikar, et 
al., 2014). Thus, future research related to the number of issues in a negotiation could 
prove to be an invigorating new area of research, and particularly invaluable for gender 
research.  
Conclusion 
While the aim of the present project is not to encourage the widespread initiation 
of negotiations, it remains important to explore whether the reasons for negotiating are 
conscious, cogent, and unique for women and men. On the surface, there were no gender 
differences in the rate of initiating a negotiation nor were there vast differences in the 
reasons for negotiation. In fact, it seems women do not negotiate for many of the same 
reasons men do not negotiate. However, upon further examination, our findings present 
significant gender differences in evaluative orientation and a pattern of variance in 
probabilistic orientations. In other words, women and men behaved similarly in this study 
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but their underlying orientations toward money in this study were largely dissimilar. 
Furthermore, culture proved to have a profound effect on the propensity to negotiate. 
Findings presented in this dissertation suggest that the role of gender in the propensity to 
negotiate is more nuanced that the simple declaration that “women don’t ask.” 
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APPENDIX A 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONAIRE 
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1. What is your age?_______________years 
 
 
2. What is your ethnic background? 
 o White/Caucasian 
 o African-American 
 o Latin American/Hispanic 
 o Asian 
 o Native American 
 oOther______________________ 
 
3. Please indicate your year in college: 
 o Freshman 
 o Sophomore 
 o Junior 
 o Senior 
 o Graduate Student 
 
4. How many years of full-time work experience do you have? ______________ 
 
5. What is your current employment status? 
 o Full-time 
 o Part-time 
 o Self-employed 
 o Unemployed 
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APPENDIX B  
PROPENSITY TO INITIATE NEGOTIATION SCALE (M-PINS) 
Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn (2006) 
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1. I feel anxious when I have to ask for something I want 
2. It always takes me a long time to work up the courage to ask for things I want 
3. I feel nervous when I am in situations in which I have to persuade others to 
give me things that I want 
4. I experience a lot of stress when I think about asking for something I want 
5. It always feels so unpleasant to have to ask for things for myself 
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APPENDIX C  
PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
136 
Introduction  
1. How did you first hear about this study? 
2. Did you know what would happen in the study before you came here today?   
3. What do you think was the purpose of this study?    
Reasons for Initiating or Avoiding Negotiation  
4. Today you were paid $3 for your performance. Did you think about asking for 
more money?   
a. Why/why not?  
5. Was there anything that held you back from asking?  
6. Would you have asked for more if you thought you could get it?  
Probabilistic Orientation  
7. How do you think the payment was determined for the Boggle game?  
8. What did you think were your chances of getting the maximum amount?  
Evaluative Orientation 
9. How do you feel about the $[amount of money] that you did received? 
10. How desirable was the $10 incentive to you?  
REVEAL 
In this experiment we gave everyone $3 to see who would negotiate for more money.    
Sensemaking 
11. Is there anything about this situation that would have made you ask for more 
money?  
12. Do you think you tend to be a person who likes to ask for things or one who 
doesn't? 
137 
13. If you were given an offer for a job you really wanted but you didn’t think it paid 
enough, what would you do?  
14. What do you think about people who always ask or negotiate for a better deal? 
15. What do you think about people who never ask or never negotiate? 
16. If you were selling something like a car and someone offered to buy it for a much 
lower price than you preferred, what would you think about that person?	    
Gender and Negotiation  
17. There is some evidence that men are more likely to negotiate for more things and 
women are less likely. What do you think about this?   
18. What advice would you give to women who want to be earning more money but 
don’t feel comfortable asking for more?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
